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FAIRNESS, RESPONSIBILITY AND SELF-
DEFENSE
Re'em Segev*
I. INTRODUCTION
The content and scope of normative rules should ideally
be derived from a rational analysis of reasons for action and
their interaction. However, we often encounter a reverse rea-
soning, in which the content and scope of norms are assumed
to correspond to common intuitive judgments and their justi-
fication is explored in the hope of supporting them.1 This rea-
soning is especially prevalent in the analysis of self-defense
(including defense of property and defense of others).2 There
is a general agreement, which is rarely found in normative
* Bachelor of Law, Summa cunm Laude, 1996, Master of Law, Magna cum Laude,
1998, Doctor of Law, 2002, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Post Doctorate:
Research Fellow, University of California, Berkeley, 2002-03; Visiting Re-
searcher, Harvard University, 2003-04.
1. This kind of process is part of the method of "reflective equilibrium,"
suggested by John Rawls, which explores the justification of "considered judg-
ments" (or, at least, their compatibility to other normative conclusions), as a
way of reaching normative conclusions. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 17-19, 42-45 (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999).
2. This article uses the single term "self-defense," although my argument
is also applicable to defense of property and defense of others. Unfortunately,
common terminology concerning defensive force is problematic, especially with
respect to the relation of self-defense-in the strict sense-and defense of oth-
ers. The terms "self-defense" and "private defense" both imply that the justifi-
cation for defensive force is agent-relative, namely, varies in accordance with
the identity of the agent, though in different ways. "Self-defense" implies a dis-
tinction between an agent who defends herself and an agent who defends an-
other. "Private defense" implies a fundamental distinction between the em-
ployment of defensive force by a private person and by a public official.
Although there might be various practical differences between these categories,
the assumption underlying the thesis proposed in this article is that all relevant
reasons for action and the conclusions they entail regarding the resolution of
interpersonal conflicts are agent-neutral, i.e., apply to all agents equally. See
discussion infra Part III.
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discussions, that self-defense is justified, at least in some
paradigm situations.' Moreover, self-defense is typically con-
sidered the archetype justification for harming individuals
and the yardstick for the validity of other stated justifications
for harmful conduct. Yet despite this special status of self-
defense-or perhaps because of it-its justification is typically
presumed rather than explained.' When it is explored, many
disagreements concerning its foundation and scope emerge
and many accounts as to why self-defense is justified seem to
be unsatisfactory.5 Indeed, the "repeated failure of moral and
legal theories to establish ... grounding" for self-defense has
even led scholars to pessimism "concerning the whole project
of attempting to justify the act of defending (innocent) human
life"6 and others to consider self-defense not a justification,
but merely an excuse due to lack of sufficient culpability.7
3. This agreement is reflected in the law: "all Western legal systems recog-
nize" that self-defense is an exception to the prohibition on intentional killing.
George P. Fletcher, The Right to Life, 63 THE MONIST 135, 139 (1980).
4. Both the status of self-defense as the paradigm of justifiable harm and
the limited attention to its justification defense are noted by SUZANNE UNIACKE,
PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE 1
(1994).
5. See Whitley Kaufman, Is There a "Right" to Self-Defense, 23 CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS 20, 20 (2004):
The use of defensive force, even deadly force, in protection of self or
others (hereinafter "self-defense") is a paradigm of moral and legal
permissibility. However, just why this is so has turned out to be a puz-
zle; indeed, there is today hardly the slightest consensus on the moral
justification for this permission to use force, or even on what the vari-
ous possible alternative justifications might be.
Id.
A similar phenomenon seems to exist concerning the justification of punish-
ment: there is a wide agreement that punishment is justified, at least in some
paradigm situations, accompanied by a substantial disagreement regarding the
nature and scope of this justification. Douglas Husak argues that a similar
phenomenon exists with respect to the doctrine that ignorance or mistake of law
is no excuse. See Douglas N. Husak, Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizen-
ship, 14 LEG. STUD. 105 (1994). However, there is a more significant dissent
regarding this doctrine. See Re'em Segev, Justiflcation, Rationality and Mis-
take: Mistake of Law is No Excuse? It hght Be a Justification, LAW & PHIL.
(forthcoming 2005).
6. Michael Gorr, Private Defense, 9 LAW & PHIL. 241, 267-68 (1990) (stat-
ing that the justification for self-defense is basic and could not be accounted for
in other terms).
7. The distinction between the notions of justification and excuse is com-
plex, and in important respects this distinction is a matter of degree. However,
the core distinction between these notions is quite clear and widely accepted.
The concept of justification is essentially concerned with whether actions are
morally or legally proper, whereas the concept of excuse focuses on whether per-
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These pessimistic views are not groundless. Many theo-
sons are sufficiently responsible for actions and particularly on whether persons
who acted wrongfully or illegally are sufficiently culpable. There are various
theories of both justification and excuse, but the distinctions between them are
not important for the thesis of this article. For discussions that refer to self-
defense as an excuse, see Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Cor-
recting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who lill, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 11 (1986) (claiming that self-defense should be considered an excuse
rather than a justification). See also Kaufman, supra note 5, at 29 ('The idea of
justified force as something that society wants unequivocally to approve and en-
courage does not quite fit our intuitive reaction to self-defense, despite modem
trends."). It should be noted, however, that it is unclear whether Rosen's view
is that self-defense is never justified or that it is sometimes justified but it is
best to treat "all self-defense... as excused" for second-order reasons relating to
the adverse effects of self-help. Id. at 45. The first order interpretation is sup-
ported by the claim that "there probably is no acceptable calculus to support
treatment of self-defense as a justification." Id at 49. The second order interpre-
tation is supported by several remarks. One is the assertion that "[t]reatment of
the battered woman's defense as an excuse does not preclude justifying women
who kill men under objectively identifiable circumstances more akin to tradi-
tional self-defense." Id. at 44. Another assertion in support of this interpreta-
tion is that "[e]xcused self-defense would better meet the needs of... society in
general." Id. at 45. Finally, there is the assertion that "[flew cases in which
self-defense is claimed ... fit the model of a justification." Id. at 56. An am-
biguous position, with respect to the nature of self-defense as a justification or
excuse, is reflected in William Blackstone's assertions concerning the moral
status of self-defense and its legal standing in eighteenth century England.
Note that while Blackstone sometimes employs the terms "justification" and
"excuse," he does not draw a systematic distinction between justification of ac-
tions and responsibility for actions or culpability. Consider and compare the
following passages that contain elements of both justification and excuse:
Both the life and limbs of a man are of such high value, in the estima-
tion of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed
se defendendo, or in order to preserve them. For whatever is done by a
man to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the
highest necessity and compulsion.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *130 (1860).
The law in this case respects the passions of the human mind, and ...
makes it lawful in him to do himself that immediate justice to which he
is prompted by nature, and which no prudential motives are strong
enough to restrain ... Self-defence, therefore, as it is justly called the
primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away
by the law of society. In the English law particularly it is held an ex-
cuse for breaches of the peace, nay, even for homicide itself.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3-4.
Homicide in self-defence or se defendendo, upon a sudden array, is also
excusable, rather than justifiable, by the English law.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *183. Blackstone's analysis is inter-
preted as reflecting an excuse-based account of self-defense, in light of the last
passage, by Hugo Bedau, The Right to Life, 52 THE MONIST 550, 559 (1968) and
Nancy M. Omichinski, Comment, Applying the Theories of Justifiable Homicide
to Confticts in the Doctrine of Self-Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1449
(1987).
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ries of self-defense are indeed inadequate in various respects.
It is also true that excuse is a proper ground of exculpation in
many cases of self-defense. Typically, a person cannot be
blamed for defending herself from an attack that might cause
her severe harm, regardless of whether the defense is justi-
fied.8 Nevertheless, the aim of this article is to suggest a ra-
tional justification for self-defense.
The proposed justification for self-defense is based on a
general thesis regarding the proper resolution of interper-
sonal conflicts, which combines considerations of individual
well-being and fairness.9 This general framework provides an
alternative to the moral theories that dominate the inquiry of
interpersonal conflicts in general and self-defense in particu-
lar: on the one hand, deontological theories and theories of
rights," and, on the other hand, aggregative forms of conse-
quentialism, particularly utilitarianism." The interpersonal
8. See JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE 67-68 (1985); SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 90-91 (1998). Jeff McMahan argues that persons who kill
innocent bystanders and innocent aggressors in order to save their own lives
cannot be excused. His reason is that some cases of this kind, such as that of
terrorists, which supposedly should not be excused, are similar to other cases in
which there is a threat to life. See Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem
of the Innocent Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252, 287-88 (1994). However, this argu-
ment is hasty. The question of whether agents' defense of themselves or others
should be excused is a function not of the nature of the threat but of its effects.
The nature of threats is only an indication of their effects, and the effects of
threats on agents might be different in various cases where innocent bystanders
are harmed. Typically, terrorists will be more responsible for their actions, and
therefore more culpable, than persons who are caught in unexpected situations
in which their life is in danger. For this reason, the latter will often deserve an
excuse although the former do not.
9. The general thesis is outlined in Re'em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness,
PHIL. STUD. (forthcoming 2005); Re'em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness in the
Distribution of Scarce Health Resources, 30 J. MED. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2005);
Re'em Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil: Beyond Deontology, Rights and Utili-
tafianism; and Re'em Segev, The Significance of Numbers: Intrinsic and Com-
prehensive or Instrumental and Restricted? (unpublished manuscripts, on file
with the Santa Clara Law Review). In these articles, as in this one, I focus on
small-scale, sharp and one-dimensional interpersonal conflicts that involve ba-
sic interests such as life, bodily integrity, or property.
10. Influential deontological and rights-based theories include ALAN
DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY (1977); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND
WRONG 44-53 (1978); JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 370-71
(1990); F. M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY, VOL. 1: DEATH AND WHOM TO SAVE
FROM IT (1993).
11. Influential utilitarian theories include JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon
Press 1879) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (2d ed., George Sher,
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conflicts usually referred to under the heading of self-defense
provide an important test case for central aspects of this
framework, and, more specifically, for the interplay between
considerations of well-being and one conception of fairness,
which is concerned with the moral significance of responsibil-
ity of persons for interpersonal conflicts.
The proposed view thus considers the justification for
self-defense as entailed by general principles regarding the
proper resolution of interpersonal conflict. I believe that
situations usually thought of in connection with the notion of
self-defense are part of the more general category of interper-
sonal conflicts, and should therefore be governed by general
principles concerning such conflicts, rather than an inde-
pendent category that should be governed by exclusive prin-
ciples. In other words, the proposed thesis rests on the as-
sumption that no sharp line distinguishes self-defense cases
from other kinds of interpersonal conflicts. To be sure, there
are normative differences between various kinds of interper-
sonal conflicts, but only since part of the general principles
are relevant only with respect to certain cases and because
the significance and force of the applicable principles might
vary in light of the nature of each conflict. Specifically, self-
defense situations are unique since the suggested responsibil-
ity-based principle apply in special force in some of them, par-
ticularly in the paradigm case of self-defense, in which one
person unjustifiably and culpably attacks another who in no
way contributed to the conflict.
Section II of this article provides a description of the
main issues that are considered in it and a general outline of
the assumptions underlying the article in regards to the rela-
tion between morality and law.1 2 Section III outlines the pro-
posed thesis and explains its implications in the context of
self-defense.13 Section IV explores the normative significance
of the notion of responsibility, which is central to the pro-
posed thesis. Specifically, Section IV compares the suggested
responsibility-based principle to other principles that are
based on a similar notion of responsibility and examines vari-
ed., Hackett 2001) (1861); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS (7th ed.,
Macmillan 1907) (1874).
12. See discussion infra Part II.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
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ous objections made against these principles. 4 Finally, Sec-
tion V explains why I believe the proposed thesis is preferable
to other kinds of dominant accounts of self-defense. 5
II. THE QUESTIONS
The article explores three main issues. The first and
most fundamental question is the nature of the justification
for the paradigm case of self-defense, namely, the justification
for harming an aggressor who unjustifiably and culpably at-
tacks and endangers the well-being of another who is not re-
sponsible for the attack and thus for the existence of the con-
flict. According to the proposed thesis, self-defense situations
should be viewed as a special kind of interpersonal conflicts,
since they require a choice between the well-being of the ag-
gressor and that of the person under attack (assuming that
harm to at least one of them is unavoidable). According to
this thesis, the justification for self-defense is therefore based
upon a set of principles concerning the resolution of interper-
sonal conflicts in general, which identify several morally sig-
nificant considerations, based on the notions of well-being
and fairness, and resolve clashes between these considera-
tions.
The second issue is the implication of the basic justifica-
tion for self-defense with respect to a requirement of propor-
tionality in the employment of defensive force. There is wide
agreement that it is justified to harm an aggressor in the
paradigm case of self-defense if this is necessary in order to
prevent the aggressor from harming an innocent victim, even
if the conjectured harm to the aggressor is more severe than
the conjectured harm the attack creates. For example, it is
generally considered justified to kill an aggressor in order to
prevent a severe, but not deadly, bodily injury to the attacked
person. 6 However, there is a dispute as to whether the last
proposition should be qualified by a requirement of propor-
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
16. The standard example used to illustrate this point is of a person who
defends her life by killing several aggressors. I avoid this example since it is
based on the dubious assumption that harm to several persons is worse than an
identical harm to one person. I question this assumption in Segev, The Signiff-
cance ofNubers, supra note 9. In order to bypass this complex issue, this ar-
ticle focuses on conflicts involving only one person on each side of the conflict.
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tionality. Such a requirement would not justify severely
harming an aggressor in order to prevent a trivial danger to
her victim, for example, killing an aggressor in order to keep
her from damaging a trivial property of another. 7 The pro-
posed thesis implies a requirement of proportionality, which
excludes such actions.
The third issue is the normative significance of responsi-
bility of individuals for the existence of interpersonal conflicts
in determining the proper resolution of such conflicts. The
suggestion in this regard is that culpable aggressors and oth-
ers who are responsible for the existence of interpersonal con-
flicts, based on a choice-based conception of responsibility,
should be distinguished from other persons involved in inter-
personal conflicts who are not responsible for their existence.
(Throughout the article, I will use the term "responsibility" in
the sense of a choice-based conception of responsibility, unless
I explicitly note otherwise.) The category of responsible
agents must be broken down into sub-categories since indi-
viduals might be responsible for interpersonal conflicts to
various degrees, and the degree of responsibility affects its
normative significance. The category of non-responsible indi-
viduals includes, inter alia, the following common sub-
classifications: (1) "innocent aggressor?: individuals who en-
17. The necessity requirement, namely, the requirement that the force used
will be necessary in order to stop the attack, and the requirement of proportion-
ality, are independent of each other. Suzanne Uniacke argues that "[a]lthough
necessity and proportionality are distinguishable conditions ... considerations
of proportionality ... must sometimes form part of the normative background
against which necessity is judged." See UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 83. How-
ever, such a sweeping claim, that the requirements of necessity and proportion-
ality are necessarilyinterconnected with respect to every conception of necessity
and every conception of proportionality, seems misguided. Indeed, the con-
tended interrelation between these requirements is not even demonstrated in
the examples provided by Uniacke. Generally, these examples involve cases in
which force is strictly necessary, regardless of considerations of proportion. Her
first kind of example provides that, "instead of using lethal force against an ag-
gressor I could avoid being killed myself by complying with the aggressor's de-
mands, (say) by participating in a murder or by revealing the whereabouts of
someone who will be then endangered." Id. However, in this case, although the
force considered is not necessary in order to save an interest of the agent, it is
strictly necessary in order to save the interest of another person. Her second
kind of example provides that the endangered agent could have avoided being
caught in the dangerous situation. See id. This case does not, however, demon-
strate that force is not strictly necessary, but rather, as explained in the next
section, that other considerations, concerning prior responsibility, might also be
relevant in the resolution of interpersonal conflicts.
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danger others knowingly, even intentionally, but are not re-
sponsible for their behavior (for example, insane aggressors);
(2) "innocent threats": individuals whose body constitute
physical threats to others without their control (for example,
a person who is thrown by another down a well at the bottom
of which there is a third person who will be crushed and
killed by the body of the falling person); (3) "innocent shields
of threatd': individuals who are "so situated that they will be
damaged by the only means available for stopping the threat"
(for example, a person who is strapped to the front of a tank
of an aggressor so that the tank cannot be hit and halted
without also harming her);"8 and, most obviously, (4) "by-
standers": individuals who are not related to the danger in
any way but sacrificing or actively harming them is the only
way to save others (for example, each of two drowning per-
sons only one of whom could be saved, or a person whose
property could be harmed in order to save the property of an-
other person). The proposed view is that since all these sub-
groups include individuals who are not responsible for the ex-
istence of the relevant conflict, according to a choice-based
conception of responsibility, they should be treated in the
same manner. The proposed thesis thus differs from the
common view that considers causal responsibility, for exam-
ple, the responsibility of innocent threats, as a morally sig-
nificant factor. 9 Accordingly, the term "innocent" in this arti-
cle refers to individuals who are not responsible, according to
a choice-based conception of responsibility, for the existence
of the pertinent interpersonal conflict. This use should be
distinguished from the common use of the term "innocence,"
which refers to a causal conception of responsibility and thus
20
considers as responsible, for example, innocent threats.
There are, of course, other aspects of the justification and
18. The terms and quotes concerning the last two categories are from
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 34-35 (1974) (suggesting that a
self-defense justification is applicable to innocent threats and leaves open the
question of innocent shields of threats).
19. See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 24 ("it is almost universally accepted that
one has a right to use deadly force against even an innocent aggressor, such as
the psychotic aggressor or the mistaken aggressor").
20. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123,
139 (1972); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Deaths, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
146, 154 (1972); UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 78-81, 95-96.
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content of self-defense.2 However, I focus on the above three
issues since they are the ones which are most directly rele-
vant to the main aspects of the thesis I suggest.
The analysis of the justification for self-defense, and its
boundaries, essentially applies to both moral and legal norms.
The law should not necessarily reflect every valid moral stan-
dard, since some moral standards would not be significantly
furthered by their incorporation into the law or are not im-
portant enough to justify their incorporation into the law in
light of the price of legal enforcement.22 Otherwise, the law
should reflect proper moral standards.23 This is generally the
case in the context of interpersonal conflicts involving basic
interests that are threatened by serious adverse effects, since,
in these cases, the above considerations are either not rele-
vant or, when they are relevant, are not decisive. Indeed. Al-
though there is a disagreement as to the proper limits of the
law, it is widely accepted that it should at least be concerned
with the protection of important interests of individuals from
harm.24 While this idea involves various difficult questions
21. Examples for other questions are whether, within a requirement of ne-
cessity, safe retreat should be generally required and whether a self-defense
justification requires that the agent's actions be accompanied with a belief, or
knowledge, that the necessary factual conditions are present and perhaps intent
to defend herself or someone else. Since the answer to the last question might
affect my analysis at several points, I should note that I assume that a rational
belief in the existence of the relevant justificatory circumstances is a precondi-
tion for justification. I explain why in Segev, supra note 5. This issue is dis-
cussed in the context of self-defense by, for example, Russell Christopher, Self-
Defense and Defense of Others, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123 (1998).
22. A parallel condition might be relevant also in the moral sphere, so that
only reasons beyond a certain threshold of importance should be the basis for
moral norms. See SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 68 (Clarendon
Press 1989). Obviously, the threshold in the legal sphere should be higher in
light of the additional cost of legal regulation.
23. There are various ways of reflecting normative standards. In this con-
text we should bear in mind the distinction between ultimate moral standards
and the public-including legal-rules that would best further the aims of the
ultimate standards. Occasionally, an exact reflection of ultimate standards in
public rules would not be the optimal method of furthering the aims of these
standards. Particularly, there are often strong (though not necessarily decisive)
reasons for formulating public-including legal-rules in advance and in a rela-
tively clear form. This might occasionally justify, for example, less precision at
the margins for the sake of clarity.
24. The classic articulation of the position that the prevention of harm to
people other than the agent is the only justified aim for the use of coercion, in-
cluding through the law, is by JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Brom-
wich et al. eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
392 SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW Vol: 45
about its proper content and boundaries,25 its core seems both
justified and widely agreed upon, and the main disputes con-
cern the question of whether the law should go beyond this
sphere.26 Thus, the analysis of the proper resolution of inter-
personal conflicts in general, and the moral justification of
self-defense in particular, is directly applicable in the legal
sphere.27
III. FAIRNESS AS THE BASIS OF SELF-DEFENSE
A. The General Thesis
The general thesis I suggest for the resolution of inter-
25. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS xv-xxi (John
Gray ed., 1998) (surveying some of the main problems raised by Mill's Harm
Principle).
26. For discussions of the legitimacy of other grounds for invoking the law,
see H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (Oxford Univ. Press 1963); 1
JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO
OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG,
HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).
27. While emphasizing the connection between moral and legal standards,
inter alia, in the context of self-defense, Kent Greenawalt suggests that there
are distinctions between the moral and the legal spheres beyond those sug-
gested above (he refers mainly to prevailing legal norms, but his discussion
clearly shows that he also considers proper moral and legal standards to be
closely connected). For example, he states that even if there is a moral distinc-
tion between culpable and innocent aggressors, it should not necessarily be re-
flected in the law as most aggressors are culpable, and "many cases of innocent
aggression will reasonably appear wrongful to the victim, who must, of course,
act quickly without much thought about the character of his assailant." Kent
Greenawalt, Violence - Legal Justiftcation and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J.
437, 474 (1983). Based on this observation, he writes, "one can well understand
why legal standards are not drafted to require assessment of the victim's
knowledge of an aggressor's innocence in these exceptionally rare cases." Id.
Greenawalt's factual observation may well be correct, and it should affect the
evaluation of the actions of agents who protected themselves or others from at-
tackers that they reasonably but mistakenly assumed to be culpable. But I fail
to see how this empirical observation, in itself, justifies a difference between
moral and legal standards in this context. In principle, this observation is rele-
vant to the evaluation of the justification of actions both in the moral and in the
legal spheres. If there is a distinction between culpable and innocent aggres-
sors, and if the assumptions of agents in this respect are relevant for the
evaluation of the justification of their actions, as Greenawalt rightly assumes,
why not reflect this distinction not only in morality but also in the law, even if it
will be relevant only in rare cases? There might be various evidentiary consid-
erations in this regard that are especially relevant in institutional, and, particu-
larly, legal settings, but such considerations should not affect cases in which the
relevant factual factors are not in disputed.
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personal conflicts rests on two basic ideas.28 First, the fun-
damental value and source of reasons for actions, in the con-
text of interpersonal conflicts, is individual well-being. Sec-
ond, interpersonal conflicts-in which reasons for action to
protect the well-being of different persons clash-should be
resolved in light of several conceptions of fairness, which re-
flect the independent value of persons, the difference in the
importance of various aspects of individual well-being and the
moral significance of responsibility of persons for interper-
sonal conflicts.
In other words, according to the proposed theory, indi-
vidual well-being is what we should fundamentally care
about whereas the concept of fairness is concerned with how
we should care for this value when we are confronted by in-
terpersonal conflicts.
It is important to emphasize that, according to the pro-
posed thesis, the concepts of individual well-being and fair-
ness do not represent competing fundamental values: the idea
that interpersonal conflicts should be resolved fairly com-
pletes the idea that individual well-being is the fundamental
value, rather than constitutes a contrasting idea concerning
the fundamental value. This feature becomes clear once we
notice that the concept of fairness becomes applicable only
when there is an internal clash within the concept of individ-
ual well-being.
These two basic ideas are elaborated in five principles
that reflect agent-neutral (rather than agent-relative) and
impartial reasons for action:29
(1) The Well-Being Principle reflects the intrinsic value of
each person. It holds that there is a reason to protect, en-
hance, and at the least to not adversely affect the well-being
of persons. 0
28. For an elaboration of these ideas and the principles they entail, see
Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, supra note 9 and Segev, The Concept of Lesser
EVIl, supra note 9.
29. The agent-neutrality and particularly the impartiality assumption could
be stated more accurately in the form of a preliminary principle. The Impartial-
ity Principle reflects the equal value of each person. It holds that reasons for
actions are agent-neutral, that is, apply equally to all agents and particularly
that reasons for actions should be evaluated from an impartial perspective, in-
stead of an agent-relative perspective that accords special weight to personal
aspects of agents' lives. See Segev, The Concept ofLesser EVIl, supra note 9.
30. Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, supra note 9; Segev, The Concept of
Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
2005 393
SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW
(2) The Equal Chance Pinciple, which reflects a consid-
eration of fairness, addresses clashes that arise within the
Well-Being Principle between conflicting reasons to protect
the well-being of different individuals. It is based upon the
following considerations: (a) each person has an intrinsic and
independent value and therefore the fate of each person is in-
trinsically and independently significant; (b) a resolution of
an interpersonal conflict is, for each of the persons whose in-
terests are involved in the conflict, a question of all or nothing
(as far as the interest at stake is concerned);31 and (c) there is
no common denominator with regard to which interests of dif-
ferent persons could be traded-off without a loss. In light of
these truisms, the Equal Chance Principle, as an aspect of the
more general concept of fairness, holds that there is a reason
to accord equal weight to the well-being of each person who
will be affected by the resolution of an interpersonal conflict.
This reason should be elaborated in the form of the fol-
lowing two hierarchical sub-principles: (a) there is a reason to
distribute benefits or inevitable costs between all persons
equally, so that each would get the maximum possible equal
benefit or bear the minimum possible equal loss, or, when ex-
act equality is impossible, so that each person would get a
roughly equal benefit or incur a roughly equal loss, provided
that the benefit or reduction of cost for each person is signifi-
cant; (b) if it is impossible to save or benefit each person to a
significant and roughly equal degree, the second best option is
to accord each person the highest possible equal chance to be
preferred, and then save, or otherwise benefit, the person
chosen in this way. For simplicity, this article assumes that
it is impossible to prevent harm with respect to each person
to a significant and roughly equal degree and for this reason
the second best option applies and the Equal Chance Princi-
ple bears a literal meaning."
(3) The Importance Pinciple, which reflects another con-
ception of fairness, signifies the difference in the importance
of various aspects of individual well-being. It holds that the
strength of the reason provided by the Well-Being Principle
depends on the importance of the interest at stake, the prob-
31. This point is elaborated in Segev, Well-Being and Fairness in the Dis-
tribution of Scarce Health Resources, supra note 9.
32. Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, supra note 9; Segev, The Concept of
Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
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ability that it will be affected in case of inaction, and the
probability that an action will affect it. The Importance Prin-
ciple thus incorporates and elaborates the Well-Being Princi-
ple. If the two probabilities above are equal, the more impor-
tant is the interest, the stronger is the reason to protect,
enhance and not harm it. Therefore, in resolving interper-
sonal conflicts, there is a reason to prefer the person who
would be affected most significantly by the resolution of the
conflict (e.g., there is a reason to prefer the person whose life
could be saved over a person whose property could be saved).3"
(4) The Substantial Difference Principle resolves the po-
tential clash between the Equal Chance Principle and the
Importance Principle. It holds that the Importance Principle
prevails over the Equal Chance Principle if (taking relevant
probabilities into account) there is a substantial gap in the
importance of the competing interests.1
(5) The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility, which may
be considered as a third aspect of the concept of fairness, ac-
counts for the rational power of persons by making them ac-
countable for their choices. It holds that, when an interper-
sonal conflict requires a choice between the well-being of
individuals, there is a reason to prefer those who are not re-
sponsible for the existence of the conflict over those who are,
and those who are less responsible over those who are more
responsible (according to a choice-based conception of respon-
sibility). In other words, the responsibility of a person for an
interpersonal conflict in which at least one person must bear
a setback to her well-being or forgo a benefit is a reason that
the responsible, or the more responsible, person, should bear
the burden or enjoy the benefit involved in the resolution of
the conflict, rather than the non-responsible, or the less re-
35
sponsible, person.
The resolution of potential clashes between the Principle
of Fairness-Responsibility and the previous principles de-
pends on the relative force of the conflicting principles, which
is determined in light of the importance of the competing in-
terests, the relevant probabilities, and the degree of responsi-
bility of each person for the existence of the conflict.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
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The proposed set of principles does not provide specific
conclusions regarding the resolution of each of the wide vari-
ety of potential interpersonal conflicts. The aim of these prin-
ciples is more modest: to identify the main normative factors
that are relevant in the context of interpersonal conflicts, in-
cluding self-defense settings, as well as the major possible
clashes between them, and to point out the general outline of
the way in which these clashes should be resolved.
The proposed principles are different from two kinds of
influential moral theories in several respects. First, the pro-
posed principles differ from standard deontological theories
and theories of rights, which reject the basic consequential
idea that it is always right (and required) to act in the way
that is expected to lead to the best possible state of affairs,
and embrace agent-relative constraints (framed in the lan-
guage of duties or rights) that forbid certain actions, particu-
larly those that positively harm individuals, even when these
actions lead to the best possible consequences. The theory
presented in this article is different from these theories in two
respects. First, the proposed framework considers the basic
normative unit to be reasons for action and the right action as
the one that best reflects all valid reasons for action. In con-
trast, consequential theories consider the basic normative
unit to be states of affairs and the right action as the one that
leads to the best possible overall state of affairs. Second, the
proposed principles reflect agent-neutral, rather than agent-
relative, reasons for action. Third, the suggested principles
reflect the idea that individual well-being is the fundamental
value (rather that non-consequential duties or rights). Ac-
cording to the proposed thesis, the value of individual well-
being needs to be construed, supplemented or adjudicated in
interpersonal conflicts, in light of the above conceptions of
fairness, in order to convey proper concern to the well-being of
different persons when resolving interpersonal conflicts.
However, unlike deontological and rights-based theories, the
proposed principles, and particularly the concept of fairness
which they reflect, do not substitute or limit the fundamental
value of individual well-being in light of other fundamental
values, such as non-derivative duties and rights. Despite the
intuitive appeal of deontological and rights-based theories,
and their prevalence in current philosophical discourse, it is
hard to justify them and therefore I suggest that they should
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be rejected. 6
The proposed theory also differs from standard conse-
quential theories, and particularly from utilitarianism, in
various respects. First, it focuses on reasons for action and
the best way of reflecting them, rather than on states of af-
fairs and the best way of maximizing various features of
them. Second, it relies on conceptions of fairness, and conse-
quently on distributive and backward-looking considerations.
Third, it rejects sweeping aggregation of different kinds of in-
terests, regardless of their nature, importance, or effect on
persons as individuals. The last two points are, of course,
familiar criticisms of utilitarianism. As many have noted,
aggregative forms of consequentialism, particularly utilitari-
anism, do not properly reflect the independent value of each
person as an individual.37
Despite these differences, the proposed theory is never-
theless essentially consequential in one important respect: it
considers individual well-being as the fundamental value and
source of reasons for actions. The other suggested reasons for
action do not represent competing fundamental values, but
rather reflect what is considered the proper or fair way of re-
solving interpersonal conflicts of well-being. Moreover, the
proposed theory goes as far as any complete moral theory
conceptually could and, in my opinion, substantively should,
in endorsing the idea that the fundamental standard for the
rightness of actions is their effect on individual well-being.
Conceptually, every complete normative theory - that is, a
theory that aims at providing general guidance for actions -
36. For a systematic analysis and rejection of alleged justifications for deon-
tological or rights-based limitations, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION
OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONCEPTIONS 87-116 (Clarendon
Press 1982) and KAGAN, supra note 22, at 24-46 and chs. 3-4. I explain my rea-
sons for rejecting deontological and rights-based constrains in Segev, The Con-
cept ofLesser Evil, supra note 9.
37. This criticism is widely accepted since RAWLS, supra note 1, at 22-30,
66-69, 175-92. A more complicated question, which is beyond the scope of this
article, is whether what is wrong with utilitarianism is aggregation itself, the
sweeping nature of utilitarian aggregation, or merely its indifference to dis-
tributive and fairness-based considerations within an aggregative framework.
The latter view seems to be the more prevalent. For this view see Derek Parfit,
Justifiability to Each Person, 16 RATIO 368, 379-84, 389 (2003). But I believe
that aggregation itself raises difficulties. I explore the complex question of the
moral significance of various forms of aggregation in Segev, The Significance of
Numbers, supra note 9.
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must go beyond this idea in order to resolve internal clashes
within it, such as those that emerge in interpersonal conflicts
of well-being. Indeed, even utilitarianism-the paradigm of a
consequential theory-does not and cannot, as a complete
moral theory, simply declare that a certain good, like well-
being, is the fundamental normative standard. Its governing
principle is rather the maximization of the aggregate balance
of well-being. The additional normative content of this fur-
ther step is often overlooked or trivialized, perhaps due to the
common assumption that the only rational way to convey con-
cern for a certain value is by adopting an aggregative stan-
dard. From a substantive point of view, however, I believe
that this assumption is mistaken: an aggregative standard is
irrational since it does not properly reflect the independent
value of persons. Thus, the suggestion is that the idea that a
certain value, such as, individual well-being, is morally im-
portant both could and should be separated from the aggrega-
tive standard that typically accompanies it.
The common contrast between utilitarianism and deonto-
logical theories or theories of rights overlooks the possibility
of a theory of the kind proposed in this article, which consid-
ers individual well-being as the fundamental value, but re-
solves interpersonal conflicts of well-being in light of non-
aggregative conceptions of fairness.
This article does not attempt to defend the proposed
principles in their general form. Rather, its aim is to support
these principles by demonstrating that they offer a plausible
justification for self-defense. In light of this goal, the article
will not explore in depth the aspects of the proposed theory
that are not directly relevant to the justification for self-
defense. It is important, however, to clarify several major as-
pects of the principle that play a crucial role in the explora-
tion of the justification of self-defense within the framework
of the proposed set of principles - the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility. The following brief remarks, in the next sec-
tion, do not exhaust the complex and wide issue of responsi-
bility, but only note some of the basic assumptions regarding
the nature and scope of the conception of responsibility that
underlines the proposed framework.
B. The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility
According to the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility, in
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the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, there is a reason to
prefer individuals who are not responsible or are less respon-
sible for the existence of a conflict in which they are involved
to those who are responsible or more responsible, respec-
tively. This principle rests on two related ideas. First, the
capacity of persons for rationality is a ground for holding
them accountable for their choices." Second, based on the
significance of individual autonomy, as an important element
of individual well-being, there is a reason to confer a benefit
to the person who is responsible for its existence, rather to
another person, and to make a person who caused a burden to
bear it, if someone must.39
The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility reflects a con-
ception of responsibility that is based on choice, rather then
on causal responsibility. This conception reflects the assump-
tion that random facts should not affect normative conclu-
sions. ' Therefore, according to this conception, if a person
constitutes an innocent threat or an innocent shield of threat
not due to a choice she made, then she should be treated as a
bystander.
It is important to emphasize that the Principle of Fair-
ness-Responsibility does not reflect a retributive idea, accord-
38. For an extensive discussion of the idea that people should be held re-
sponsible only for their free choices, insofar as they affect others, see ERIC
RAKowsKI, EQUAL JUSTICE (Clarendon Press 1991).
39. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that typically persons who are
responsible for benefits invest resources in order to create them, and persons
who are responsible for burdens benefit from the choices that led to them.
40. I thus reject the view that there is "moral luck." For this view, see BER-
NARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-
1980, at 20 (1981); Bernard Williams, Postscript, in MORAL LUCK 251 (Daniel
Statman ed., 1993); Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24
(1979); Martha C. Nussbaum, Luck and Ethics, in MORAL LUCK 73-108 (Daniel
Statman ed., 1993); Judith Andre, Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck, 43
ANALYSIS 202 (1983); Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Luck and the Virtues of
Impure Agency, in MORAL LUCK 235 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); Brynmor
Browne, A Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck, 42 PHIL. Q. 345 (1992);
Robert Hannah, Morality De Re: Reflections on the Trolley Problem, in ETHICS:
PROBLEMS & PRINCIPLES 318 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1992).
For criticism see Brian Rosebury, Moral Responsibility and 'Moral Luck," 104
PHIL. REV. 499 (1995); Norvin Richards, Luck and Desert, 95 MIND 198 (1986);
Steven Sverdlik, Crime and Moral Luck, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 79 (1988); Nicolas Re-
scher, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 141 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); Judith Jar-
vis Thomson, Morality and Bad Luck, in MORAL LUCK 195 (Daniel Statman ed.,
1993); Michael J. Zimmerman, Luck and Moral Responsibility, 97 ETHICS 374
(1987).
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ing to which there is a reason to give a reward for a right ac-
tion and a penalty for a wrong action.4' Rather, this Principle
holds that when a choice between the interests of several in-
dividuals is inevitable, namely, when there is an interper-
sonal conflict, there is a reason why the person who is respon-
sible for the conflict's existence should bear the cost instead of
41
a non-responsible person.
The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility is thus based on
a non-retributive, choice-based conception of responsibility.
Therefore, this principle applies both to wrongful and to justi-
fied choices and actions. According to the suggested choice-
based conception of responsibility, a person is responsible for
the existence of a conflict if she chooses to perform an action
that led to it. Generally, this principle applies when a person
chooses to take a risk that might lead to a conflict between
her interests and those of others. For example, the Principle
of Fairness-Responsibility applies when a person chooses to
engage in a potentially risky recreational activity, such as
swimming, and is caught in a storm so that the only way to
save her life requires substantially damaging a boat. If it is
possible to use either the swimmer's boat or another person's
boat, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility holds that,
other things being equal, we should use the swimmer's boat.43
The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility's reliance on a
choice-based conception of responsibility should be contrasted
with a causal conception of responsibility. This principle does
not apply to persons involved in an interpersonal conflict if
they are not responsible for a choice that led to it, even if they
constitute or are a part of a threat. This group includes, inter
alia, innocent aggressors, innocent threats, innocent shields
of threats, and bystanders." While there is a reason to prefer
a non-responsible person to a responsible person when resolv-
ing an interpersonal conflict, there is no reason to prefer one
person to another just because she causally constitutes a
41. The difference between the notions of fairness and retribution, in the
above senses, is noted, for example, in KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS, supra note
8, at 55-57.
42. This is why I prefer to call this the "Principle of Fairness-Responsibility"
rather than just the "Principle of Responsibility."
43. In addition, if the only available boat belongs to another person, the
Principle of Fairness-Responsibility holds that there is a reason that the swim-
mer should compensate the boat's owner for her loss.
44. For an explanation of these terms, see discussion supra Part II.
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threat or a part of a threat. In other words, there is no reason
to distinguish between non-responsible or innocent persons,
whatever their role in the conflict: bystanders, (innocent) ag-
gressors, (innocent) threats, or (innocent) shields of threats.
Indeed, since there is no substantive difference between vari-
ous categories of innocent (non-responsible) persons, it be-
comes hard to draw the lines between these categories on
non-arbitrary grounds.'
On the other hand, the non-retributive character of the
Principle of Fairness-Responsibility makes it applicable be-
yond agents who are responsible for wrongful actions, such as
an aggressor who unjustifiably and culpably attacks another
and thereby creates a situation in which one of them must be
harmed. This principle applies also to agents who choose to
perform justified actions that create a special risk of generat-
ing an interpersonal conflict." For example, the decision of a
person, such as the swimmer in the previous example, to en-
gage in a recreational activity that involves a slight risk of
leading to an interpersonal conflict (which requires a choice
between her interests and those of another). A decision to en-
gage in such an activity might be justified, due to its benefits,
including the pleasure the agent derives from it, despite the
slight risk it involves. Nevertheless, under the proposed con-
ception, this person might be responsible for the existence of a'
45. For the implication of the proposed theory with respect to defense
against non-responsible aggressors and threats see discussion infra Part III.C.
Remember also that even when it is unjustified to harm one innocent person in
order to save another, including when the former is an innocent aggressor,
threat or shield of threat, it does not necessarily follow that the defender is
blameworthy for doing so. He might be excused. See discussion supra Part I.
46. For a similar argument, see ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION
ETHICS 315 (2000) ("The critical variable is not whether the behavior is moral or
immoral but whether one could have knowledge of the risks involved and volun-
tarily choose whether to engage in the behavior .... [T]here could be a behavior
that we do not consider ethically suspect in the slightest but nevertheless poses
a significant risk for needing an organ."). There is, however, one exception to
the rule that the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility is concerned with the re-
sponsibility for instead of the justifiability of actions: persons who take justifi-
able risks in order to protect the well-being of themselves or of others. For ex-
ample, the fact that a firefighter is fully responsible for a risk of harming
herself during her professional activity does not make her less eligible for help if
the risk materializes. See id. at 316; Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mis-
chiefand Misfortune, 41 McGILL L.J. 91, 111 (1995) ("[Rescuers are allowed to
expose themselves to risks that would normally preclude recovery from their
injurers . .. . [T]he special treatment accorded rescuers supposes their activity
to be important enough to make them bear proportionally less risk.").
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conflict that is attributed to the risks she created. If this is
indeed the case, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility sug-
gests that she should bear the cost involved in resolving the
conflict. Particularly, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility
applies whenever a person made a choice to take a risk that
could lead to a conflict between her interests and those of
others, regardless of whether she was aware of this conse-
quence or whether she aimed to create such a conflict.47
The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility refers to respon-
sibility for dangers, and consequently for interpersonal con-
flicts, rather than to the temporal or spatial proximity of the
responsible person to the agent. For this reason, the Princi-
ple covers persons who are responsible for the existence of in-
terpersonal conflicts even if they are not the direct or imme-
diate source of the danger or are not in the danger's vicinity.
For example, this principle applies to persons who coerce oth-
ers to harm third parties and to persons who are responsible
for a situation in which a choice needs to be made between
their interests and those of others at a later time or at a dis-
tance place (relative to the time and place in which the re-
sponsible party performed the relevant action). In other
words, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility is applicable
not only to responsible aggressors, but also to what might be
called responsible "bystanders," i.e., persons who are not a
current or direct threat but have made a choice that led to an
interpersonal conflict.48 Whether we refer to the justification
for harming such persons under the category of self-defense,
or under the broader category of interpersonal conflicts, is of
course immaterial.
People may be responsible for various kinds of actions
and inactions, as well as for conflicts that might ensue from
them. Consequently, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility
has wide and diverse implications in many contexts. For ex-
ample, it provides a reason to give the benefit that resulted
from the work of one person to the person who performed the
work rather than to another who chose to perform some lei-
surely activity instead of working. The practical implications
47. The knowledge and aim of the agent might, however, affect her degree of
responsibility.
48. Sometimes it will be practically impossible to resolve the conflict by
harming a responsible person who is not present at the vicinity of the conflict,
but occasionally this might be possible.
402 Vol: 45
JUSTIFICATION FOR SELF-DEFENSE
of this principle might, however, be limited in many contexts
in which individuals cannot be held responsible for various
situations or can only be held responsible for situations to a
limited degree. Nevertheless, it seems that individuals can
be held responsible for at least small-scale and one-
dimensional interpersonal conflicts that are the result of rela-
tively clear choices, such as those described above in the ex-
amples of the reckless swimmer or the culpable aggressor."
Responsibility is a matter of degree," particularly for in-
terpersonal conflicts. Under the preferred conception of re-
sponsibility, the extent of the responsibility of a person for an
act and its consequences appears to be dependent mainly on
the nature and degree of the risk the act is expected to cre-
ate.5 For example, although a person who engages in a rec-
reational activity that involves a slight risk of creating an in-
terpersonal conflict might be responsible for such a conflict,
she is less responsible than a person who attacks another,
thereby creating a conflict between her interests and those of
the person attacked. The difference in the degree of responsi-
bility affects the force of the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility: the higher the degree of one's responsibility
for a conflict, the stronger the reason that this person should
bear its cost.5"
49. Brian Barry claims that a similar principle, the "Principle of Responsi-
bility," does not justify substantial economic inequalities, since people are not
responsible for many factors that affect differences in the distribution of re-
sources. See Brian Barry, Does Responsibility Undermine Equality? (2003)
(unpublished, on file with the Santa Clara Law Review). However, it does apply,
inter alia, to isolated situations of the kind described above. Id at 25 ("It is per-
fectly fair that those who get themselves into situations in which they need res-
cuing at great expense and perhaps also risk to life and limb should have to pay
for it."). Similarly, Eric Rakowski describes injuries suffered as a result of en-
gaging in dangerous activities as an "exemplary" instance of "option luck" (the
consequences of a person accepting an isolated risk that should have been an-
ticipated and could have been declined by that person) that should be born by
that person. See RAKOWSKI, supra note 38, at 79.
50. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity, in ACTION AND VALUE
IN CRIMINAL LAw 239, 249 (John Gardner et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1993)
(explaining that responsibility is a "matter of degree which ranges along a con-
tinuum").
51. This factor is noted, in the context of allocating organs for transplant, by
VEATCH, supra note 46, at 314 ("[i]f voluntary, health-risky behaviors are rele-
vant to organ allocation.., there needs to be a predictable relationship between
the amount of the behavior and the degree of risk ... The degree of risk should
be proportional to the amount of the behavior").
52. A different suggestion is that the degree of responsibility should affect
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Most people take many risks every day, such as those in-
volved in walking or driving, and these risks might lead to in-
terpersonal conflicts. However, this does not undermine the
Principle of Fairness-Responsibility. This principle is signifi-
cant not only when some individuals are fully responsible and
others are in no way responsible for a conflict, but also when
there is a difference in the degree of the relevant risk. Ac-
cording to this principle, when several persons are responsi-
ble for the existence of a conflict, there is a reason to prefer a
more responsible person to another who is responsible to a
lesser degree. For example, while every person who drives a
car takes a risk of an accident, this risk is relatively minor,
and since most people take it, it will work both ways in many
interpersonal conflicts that are the result of this risk. In such
conflicts, the persons involved would often be responsible to a
similar, minor degree. However, driving carelessly or without
taking standard precautions, such as wearing a seat belt, is
more dangerous and less prevalent, and therefore this risk is
more significant. If it would lead to an interpersonal conflict,
a careless driver would typically be significantly more respon-
sible than other persons who are involved in the conflict.
Driving in motor races is even more dangerous and less com-
mon, and thus taking this risk will typically be even more
significant.
C The Proposed Thesis and Self-Defense
Several observations emerge when the proposed set of
principles is applied to self-defense as a type of interpersonal
conflict, and particularly to the paradigm case of an unjusti-
fied and culpable aggressor who endanger the well-being of
an innocent victim. In interpersonal conflicts, where a choice
has to be made between the well-being of two or more per-
sons, there are several conflicting reasons, expressed in the
Well-Being Principle, that should be taken into account, to
protect the well-being of each person. When no one is respon-
sible for the existence of the conflict, we should follow the
Equal Chance Principle, and thus accord each person the
highest possible equal chance to be preferred. This baseline
should be rejected only when there is a stronger contrary rea-
the discount rate of the importance of the well-being of responsible persons. See
KAGAN, supra note 8, at 55.
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son to prefer one of the persons involved.
The Equal Chance Principle needs further elaboration
because some commentators have rejected, ignored, or trivial-
ized the idea behind it. Some authors reject the Equal
Chance Principle entirely; they consider as immaterial the
answer to the question, whom to prefer in interpersonal con-
flicts in which all pertinent factors are equal or balanced." A
similar view is that when choosing between innocent parties,
there is no reason to prefer one innocent party to another and
therefore it does not matter whom we save, so long as the
choice does not "display a vicious preference for one over the
other, a preference that effectively treats one as of less value
than the other."' Another view follows the Equal Chance
Principle, but does not recognize its significance. It considers
the Equal Chance Principle to be only a tiebreaker, i.e., appli-
cable only when all relevant factors are exactly equal.55 Ac-
cording to both views, any special reason, no matter how triv-
ial, would justify deviating from the Equal Chance Principle.56
These views fail to recognize the importance of the reason
reflected in the Equal Chance Principle. The choice of whom
to prefer in conflicts between innocent parties is not a matter
of indifference, even if the considered choice does not "display
a vicious preference."57 Rather, according to the proposed the-
sis, this choice matters. This is especially true when the
competing interests are important, such as in a conflict be-
tween lives. When there are two contrary and competing rea-
sons to protect the well-being of different persons, there is
important reason, reflected in the Equal Chance Principle, to
accord each person the highest possible equal chance to be
preferred. The importance of this reason could be vividly
seen by imagining oneself in the place of one of the persons
whose interest-most notably life-is at stake in an interper-
sonal conflict. From this perspective, the decision of whom to
save is all but inconsequential. This important reason should
be outweighed only by a contrary reason whose weight is be-
53. See, e.g., DANIEL STATMAN, MORAL DILEMMAS, ch. 1 (1995); John
Broome, Selecting People Randomly, 95 ETHICS 38, 40 (1984).
54. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 71.
55. See id. at 95; John Harris, What is the Good of Health Care, 10
BIOETHICS 269, 278 (1996).
56. See Broome, supra note 53, at 40; Harris, supra note 55, at 278.
57. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 71.
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yond a certain threshold. Thus, the Equal Chance Principle
should apply when there is a contrary reason to prefer one of
the parties, as long as the contrary reason is not strong
enough to cross a certain threshold.
In order to determine the exact nature of this threshold,
we need to determine the relative force of the Equal Chance
Principle and each competing consideration. Within the pro-
posed framework, there are two considerations which might
conflict with the Equal Chance Principle: (1) the reason to
prefer a more important interest to a lesser one, which is re-
flected in the Importance Principle; and (2) the reason to pre-
fer a non-responsible person to a person who is responsible for
the existence of the conflict, which is reflected in the Principle
of Fairness-Responsibility. The force of each consideration
varies in accordance with the feature of each conflict.
The force of the reason reflected in the Equal Chance
Principle depends on the importance of the interests at stake:
the stronger the competing interests, the stronger the reason
to accord each person an equal chance. For example, there is
a stronger reason to give an equal chance in a conflict in
which lives are at stake than in a conflict between two per-
sons' proprietary interests. The force of the Importance Prin-
ciple depends on the difference in the importance of the com-
peting interests, taking probabilities into account: the bigger
the gap is, stronger is the principle and vice versa. If there is
a conflict between the Equal Chance Principle and the Impor-
tance Principle, it should thus be resolved in light of the im-
portance of the competing interests in each case. I suggest
that, as long as the difference in the importance of the con-
flicting interests is not substantial, the Equal Chance Princi-
ple should prevail over the Importance Principle. However,
when the difference in importance increases, the force of the
Importance Principle is strengthened and when the difference
becomes substantial, the Importance Principle should prevail
over the Equal Chance Principle. This conclusion is embodied
in the Substantial Difference Principle, which requires that,
other things being equal, the person with the substantially
more important interest should be preferred.58
The analysis is more complex when other things are not
58. See generally Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, supra note 9; and Segev,
The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
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equal, and particularly when one or more persons are respon-
sible for the existence of the conflict. The reason to take into
account the interests of each person applies also to the inter-
ests of persons who are responsible for interpersonal conflicts,
including unjustified and culpable aggressors in the paradigm
case of self-defense. An aggressor, even an unjustified and
culpable aggressor, is still a person whose well-being should
be taken into account. Therefore, the above analysis applies
also in the paradigm case of self-defense, subject to one im-
portant qualification: the responsibility of a person for an in-
terpersonal conflict provides an additional reason to prefer
the non-responsible person.
The effect of this reason on the analysis of an interper-
sonal conflict that one person is responsible for its existence,
and particularly of the paradigm case of self-defense, in which
one person unjustifiably and culpably attacks another who in
no way contributed to the conflict, is as follows." When the
competing interests are of equal importance, the Well-Being
Principle entails two competing reasons of equal importance.
In this case, the Equal Chance Principle provides a reason to
accord each person the highest possible equal chance to be
preferred. However, if the responsible person's degree of re-
sponsibility is significant, the reason entailed by the Equal
Chance Principle is outweighed by the reason entailed by the
Principle of Fairness-Responsibility, to prefer the non-
responsible person. The condition of significant responsibility
exists by definition in the paradigm case of self-defense.
Therefore, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility provides a
basis for the justification to harm the responsible aggressor in
order to save the non-responsible person in this case.
The situation becomes even more complicated when the
interests of the aggressor and of the non-responsible person
are not equally important. In this case, the Importance Prin-
ciple also factors in. The conclusion is obvious when the
choice is between the less important interest of an aggressor
and the more important interest of a non-responsible person,
because the Importance Principle and the Principle of Fair-
59. For simplicity, I assume throughout that the person who is being at-
tacked is in no way responsible for her situation. If she is, there is another rea-
son against preferring her. The force of the reasons based on the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility varies, as noted above, in accordance with the degree of
responsibility. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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ness-Responsibility both provide reasons to prefer the non-
responsible person. The difficulty arises when the aggressor's
interest is more important than that of the non-responsible
person. For example, such a situation arises when an aggres-
sor threatens the property or bodily integrity of another and
the only way to neutralize the threat is by killing the aggres-
sor. In such cases, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility's
preference for the non-responsible person clashes with the
Importance Principle's preference for the aggressor due to her
more important interest.
Generally, there are three possibilities in this kind of
case, depending on the relative force of the relevant princi-
ples. First, the fairness-responsibility consideration, that fa-
vors the non-responsible person, might outweigh the impor-
tance consideration, that favors the responsible person whose
interest is more important. This might happen not only when
the responsibility is significant and the difference in impor-
tance is small, but also when the consideration of fairness-
responsibility is very strong, as in the paradigm case of self-
defense, even when the difference in the important of the
competing is substantial.
Second, the force of both considerations might be roughly
the same. In this case, the pertinent considerations on either
side balance each other out, and we should follow the Equal
Chance Principle.
Finally, the importance consideration that favors the re-
sponsible person whose interest is more important, might
outweigh the fairness consideration that favors the non-
responsible person. This might happen either when the re-
sponsibility is insignificant or, when it is, as in the paradigm
case of self-defense, if the difference in importance is very big.
It is hard to determine the exact threshold, but one point is
clear. As noted above, with respect to conflicts between the
interests of two non-responsible persons, the Substantial Dif-
ference Principle states that the Importance Principle should
prevail over the Equal Chance Principle when the difference
in the importance of the competing interests is substantial.
Therefore, when the person whose interest is more important
is responsible for the existence of the conflict, and thus the
Principle of Fairness-Responsibility provides an additional,
clashing, reason to prefer the non-responsible individual, the
difference in importance must therefore be more than sub-
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stantial if the Importance Principle is nevertheless to prevail.
This analysis of the conflict between the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility and the Importance Principle thus
entails a principle of proportionality in self-defense situa-
tions. According to this proportionality principle, while it is
justified to harm an aggressor in order to save a non-
responsible person, even if doing so requires causing the ag-
gressor more harm than the harm she will otherwise cause to
the non-responsible person, this is only true as long as the
difference is not beyond the threshold of proportionality
(which requires more than the Substantial Difference Princi-
ple).
Beyond this general point, it is difficult to demarcate the
exact boundaries of the proportionality principle. The main
goal of this article is to account for the foundation of this
principle. According to the proposed analysis, this principle is
entailed by the interplay between considerations of well-
being, derived from the Well-Being Principle, and the various
considerations of fairness stemming from the Equal Chance
Principle, the Importance Principle and the Principle of Fair-
ness-Responsibility. Generally, it seems to me that the pro-
portionality principle should entail, inter alia, the following
conclusions with respect to the paradigm case of self-defense.
First, it is unjustified to kill or severely injure an aggressor in
order to prevent her from damaging the property of another
who is not responsible for the conflict, or from trivially injur-
ing a non-responsible person, such as scratching her. How-
ever, second, it is justified to severely injure or even kill an
aggressor who would otherwise cause a substantial bodily in-
jury to a non-responsible person. It is also justified, third, to
destroy an aggressor's valuable property if she would other-
wise destroy a relatively minor property of a non-responsible
person. But, fourth, it might be unjustified to destroy an ag-
gressor's house in order to prevent her from causing a rela-
tively small damage to a non-responsible person's property
(the answer depends on the degree of responsibility and the
exact magnitude of the gap in the importance of the compet-
ing interests in each case).
Finally, two clarifications are required with respect to
conflicts involving non-responsible persons on both sides, in-
cluding, in addition to bystanders, also innocent threats and
innocent shield of threats. First, with respect to non-
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responsible aggressors or persons who constitute threats, a
person is not required to stand idle in front of an attack by an
innocent aggressor or a person who constitute an innocent
threat. Rather, the agent should follow the principles govern-
ing the resolution of conflicts between non-responsible par-
ties, particularly the Equal Chance Principle and the Sub-
stantial Difference Principle. For example, the agent might
be justified in restraining an innocent aggressor or in pre-
venting a threat posed by an innocent person, not only when
this could be done without harming the aggressor or the per-
son who constitute the threat, but also in two other cases.
First, when this minimizes the harm to all the persons in-
volved in the conflict, in accordance with the first part of the
Equal Chance Principle. And, second, when this involves a
substantially lesser harm to the innocent aggressor or threat
compared to the harm that would otherwise be caused to the
other party.
The second clarification is that there might be situations
in which an act of defense against an unjustified and respon-
sible aggressor will not only prevent harm to an innocent vic-
tim, but also endanger other non-responsible persons (inno-
cent bystanders, innocent threats or innocent shields of
threats). In such cases, there is not only a conflict between
the aggressor and the non-responsible victim, but also be-
tween the non-responsible victim and the other non-
responsible persons whom the defensive action might ad-
versely affect. The latter conflict should also be decided in
light of the principles governing the resolution of conflicts be-
tween non-responsible parties, namely, in such situations, a
defensive force that involves harm to non-responsible parties
might be justified only if the conditions of the Equal Chance
Principle and of the Substantial Difference Principle are met
with respect to each of the non-responsible persons.
IV. THE NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AS A BASIS FOR SELF-
DEFENSE
In its justification of self-defense, the thesis of this article
relies heavily on the notion of responsibility. This section fur-
ther develops this feature of the proposed thesis by evaluat-
ing it in light of other theories that justify self-defense based
on a notion of responsibility. The first part of this section
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presents other responsibility-based views.60 The second part
discusses the main differences between these views and the
suggested thesis.6' In light of this analysis, the final part of
this section explores various objections to the notion of re-
sponsibility and to the views presented in the first part, in
order to determine whether they apply to the proposed theory
and, where applicable, whether they are valid.62
A. Similar Responsibility-BasedAccounts of Self-Defense
Several authors have put forward the idea that responsi-
bility, mainly in the sense of culpability, is a relevant factor
in the justification of self-defense.63 Particularly, Phillip Mon-
tague, George (Kai) Draper and Jeff McMahan suggest ac-
counts of self-defense that are similar to the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility in this regard, but differ from it in
several important respects.
Montague suggests that in situations in which some indi-
viduals will unavoidably be harmed, and it is possible to
choose who, it is right to sacrifice the one "whose fault it is"
that the situation exists.64 Montague develops this idea as fol-
lows:
when unavoidable harm is being distributed among a
group of individuals, and when some members of the
group are to blame for the predicament of all, then justice
requires (ceteris paribus) that the harm be distributed
60. See discussion infra Part V.A.
61. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
62. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
63. Beyond the works I discuss in detail below see KAGAN, supra note 8, at
54; Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification, and Excuse, 22 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 53 (1993); Michael Otsuka, Ki ling the Innocent in Self-Defense, 23 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 74 (1994); Coleman & Ripstein, supra note 46, at 94-96. Coleman and
Ripstein argue for a "principle of fairness," according to which "each person
should bear the costs of her activities." They suggest that this principle should
be explicated in light of a normative conception that considers the relative im-
portance of the relevant interests, namely, security and the liberty to engage in
various activities. They point out that this principle is shared by both libertari-
anism and liberal egalitarianism but based on different conceptions of responsi-
bility: a causal conception and a choice-based conception, respectively. Coleman
and Ripstein further note that libertarianism and liberal egalitarianism subject
their different responsibility-based principles to different default rules. Accord-
ing to libertarianism, in the absence of causal responsibility, the costs of misfor-
tune should lie where they fall, whereas according to liberal egalitarianism,
misfortunes that are nobody's responsibility are to be held in common.
64. Phillip Montague, Self-Defense and Choosing between Lives, 40 PHIL.
STUD. 207, 215 (1981).
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among those who are blameworthy. 65
Similarly, Draper suggests the following two principles.
First, "other things being equal, if only one individual is
(morally) to blame for the fact that someone must sustain a
cost, then that individual should sustain the cost."66 Second,
[o]ther things being equal, if more than one person is to
blame for the fact that someone must sustain a cost, then
that cost should be divided among those persons in pro-
portion to their blame or, if the cost cannot be divided,
then the one who is most to blame should sustain the
cost.
6 7
Finally, McMahan states that
in cases in which a person's culpable action.., has made
it inevitable that someone must suffer harm, it is normally
permissible, as a matter of justice, to ensure that it is the
culpable person who is harmed rather than allowing the
costs of his wrongful action to be imposed on the morally
innocent.68
Montague, Draper and McMahan subject their principles
to similar qualifications. First, the harm to the responsible
person must be necessary in order to prevent harm to non-
responsible others.69 This qualification is obvious and uncon-
troversial as it does no more than ensure that an interper-
sonal conflict indeed exists.
The second qualification, which is less obvious, is a re-
quirement of proportionality. This requirement - which, as
explained in the previous section, is also part of the proposed
thesis" - is not clearly explained by these authors. Montague
suggests
a proportionality condition according to which the
distribution of unavoidable harm among those who
are to blame for the existence of that harm must be
65. Phillip Montague, Pumishment and Societal Defense, 2 CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS 30, 32 (1983) (emphasis omitted). See also PHILLIP MONTAGUE,
PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL DEFENSE 34-50 (Rowman & Littlefield 1995).
66. George Draper, Fairness and Self-Defense, 19 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 72,
76 (1993).
67. Id at 77.
68. McMahan, supra note 8, at 259.
69. Montague, Punishment and Societal Defense, supra note 65, at 33;
MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL DEFENSE, supra note 65, at 46; Draper,
supra note 66, at 78; McMahan, supra note 8, at 262.
70. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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proportional to the harm that would be suffered by
an innocent person under a different distribution.71
According to Montague, this condition precludes causing ma-
jor harm to a blameworthy individual in order to prevent a
minor harm to an innocent individual .
Draper supports his suggestion for a requirement of
proportionality with the explanation that "a consideration of
welfare overrides the consideration of fairness in this case."73
According to Draper, "proportionality requires only that the
harm inflicted be comparable to (or less than) the harm
thereby avoided."
74
Lastly, McMahan asserts that "it may not be permissible
to inflict a great harm on a person in order to prevent his cul-
pable action from causing a trivial harm."75
The last qualification suggested by Montague and Draper
limits their fault-based distributive principles in order to jus-
tify harming only culpable individuals. Montague states that
his principle does not "straightforwardly" apply to situations
in which harming a blameworthy individual also involves
harming an innocent individual.7 ' And Draper suggests a "di-
vide-and-conquer strategy,"77 which justifies a single action
based on several principles: some of the harmful effects of the
action are justified on self-defense grounds, while other harm-
ful effects are justified by other principles.8
71. MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL DEFENSE, supra note 65, at 45.
72. Montague, Punishment and Societal Defense, supra note 65, at 33;
MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL DEFENSE, supra note 65, at 46.
73. Draper, Fairness and Self-Defense, supra note 66, at 79.
74. Id.
75. McMahan, supra note 8, at 259 n.11.
76. Montague, Punishment and Societal Defense, supra note 65, at 33;
MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL DEFENSE, supra note 65, at 46.
77. Kai Draper, Self-Defense, Collective Obligation, and Noncombatant Li-
ability, 24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 57, 59 (1998).
78. See Draper, supra note 66, at 80-81; Draper, supra note 77, at 66.
Draper notes two principles that might be pertinent in this respect: the princi-
ple of double effect and the principle that it is justified to harm innocent persons
if this will prevent much more severe harm to other innocent persons. The first
principle is incompatible with the theory I suggest. See Segev, The Concept of
Lesser Evil, supra note 9. The second principle is similar to the Importance
Principle I suggest. However, Draper's main formulation of his principle refers
to the number of innocent persons harmed while the Importance Principle does
not assume that there is an independent moral significance to the number of
individuals involved in interpersonal conflicts. See Segev, The Significance of
Numbers, supra note 9. This principle could be applied, more plausibly in my
opinion, to conflicts involving just one non-responsible person on each side.
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B. Differences between the Proposed Thesis and Similar
Responsibility-Based Justifieations for Self-Defense
The basic idea underlying the responsibility-based ac-
counts of self-defense mentioned in the previous sub-section is
similar to that behind the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility. Accordingly, in several important respects
these accounts lead to conclusions that are similar to those of
this article with regard to the significance of responsibility in
the resolution of interpersonal conflicts. Most obviously,
these accounts typically equate innocent aggressors, innocent
threats, and innocent shields of threats with innocent by-
standers.79 These accounts also lead to the conclusion that it
is preferable to resolve interpersonal conflict by harming the
persons responsible for their existence, even if they are not
the direct source of danger."0 Beside these similarities, there
are also significant differences between the views of the three
authors described above and this article's thesis. This sub-
section explains the most significant differences.
1. The General Framework. The Notion of
Responsibility and Other Considerations
This article maintains that a proper resolution of all in-
terpersonal conflicts must rest on an analysis of the interac-
tion of several general, and possibly conflicting, reasons for
action. The above three responsibility-based accounts are
narrower. They focus almost exclusively on the fault-based
principles they suggest. Although these theories mention
other, sometimes competing, considerations and qualify these
principles in the ways described above, in order to accommo-
date these considerations, they typically do not explain the
79. See generally Nancy Davis, Abortion and Self-Defense, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 175, 188-94 (1984); McMahan, supra note 8, at 266-68 (discussing the
moral equivalence of various categories of non-responsible persons).
80. Examples are persons who coerce others to harm third parties or who
are responsible for a situation in which a choice needs to be made between their
interests and those of others at a later time or at a distant place-relative to the
time and place in which the responsible party performed the relevant action.
See McMahan, supra note 8, at 258; Draper, supra note 66, at 80-81; Draper,
supra note 77, at 63-68 (the notion of responsibility includes failure to prevent a
conflict if the agent has an "obligation" to do so). See also Lawrence Alexander,
Self-Defense and the If'lling of Noncombatants: A Reply to Ful'n wider, 5 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 408, 410-12 (1976); PAUL H. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMiNAL LAW DEFENSES
73 (1984).
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source of these clashes and how they should be resolved."'
Moreover, the positions of Montague and McMahan are
unclear with respect to the conflict between their fault-based
principles and considerations relating to the overall balance
of well-being. On the one hand, as just noted, both state that
their principles should be subject to a requirement of propor-
tionality, so that an important interest of a responsible party
may be preferred to a minor interest of a non-responsible
party. On the other hand, in various contexts, both seemingly
view their fault-based principles as absolute. McMahan
states that if his fault-based principle is accepted within a
consequential theory, it should have an "absolute priority in
the evaluation of outcomes" so that it outweighs "all other
features of the possible outcomes."82 Thus, he claims, a de-
fender is justified in killing a culpable aggressor even if there
is a "relatively low" probability that the threat the aggressor
poses would materialize. Likewise, he argues that a defender
is justified in killing "any number" of culpable aggressors if
this is necessary to save her life.83 Similarly, Montague justi-
fies harming persons who are at fault for an interpersonal
conflict, "no matter how many" such persons are harmed as a
result, when it is necessary to save the life of a non-
responsible person.s' (Both McMahan and Montague assume
that the number of individuals involved in interpersonal con-
flicts is in itself a morally significant factor.")
These assertions are incompatible with a principle of
proportionality, although both McMahan and Montague for-
mally embrace such a principle.86 On the other hand, accord-
ing to the account I suggest, the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility might clash with other principles, particularly
81. They avoid this mainly by focusing on one kind of interpersonal conflict:
conflicts between equally important interests-primarily lives-of several indi-
viduals of which some are responsible for the situation.
82. McMahan, supra note 8, at 261.
83. Id.
84. Montague, supra note 64, at 215; MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL
DEFENSE, supra note 65, at 43.
85. See McMahan, supra note 8, at 260-61 (making this claim explicitly in
this context); MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL DEFENSE, supra note 65,
at 39 (considering explicitly the numbers as relevant in interpersonal conflicts
that are not one's fault in another place). This assumption is not obvious. See
Segev, The Signficance ofNunbers, supra note 9.
86. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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the Equal Chance Principle and the Importance Principle."
And, as explained above, the interaction of these three princi-
ples is the basis for a requirement of proportionality.8
2. The Foundation of the Moral Signifcance of
ResponsibiEty: Deontology, Consequentialism
and Fairness
Another difference between the thesis of this article and
the above mentioned responsibility-based accounts of self-
defense concerns the foundation of the idea that, other things
being equal, the person responsible for an interpersonal con-
flict should bear its cost.
The thesis of this article relies on a different foundation,
which is generally suggested as an alternative both to deonto-
logical and rights-based theories as well as to common forms
of consequentialism.'9 As previously explained, the proposed
principles elaborate two basic ideas: (1) the fundamental
value and source for reasons for actions in the context of in-
terpersonal conflicts is individual well-being; and (2) the reso-
lution of interpersonal conflicts should reflect several concep-
tions of fairness relating to the distribution of benefits and
burdens: the Equal Chance Principle, the Importance Princi-
ple and the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility. This frame-
work is different from both standard deontological theories
and from standard consequential theories.0
The above mentioned authors mostly fail to discuss the
foundation of their responsibility-based accounts of self-
defense. The only brief reference to this issue is McMahan's
claim that his account is incompatible with a consequential
foundation and "is best interpreted" and in fact "must ... be
understood as a deontological theory."'" However, the two
grounds noted by McMahan for classifying his principle as
deontological are doubtful.
The first ground is that the sacrifice of the culpable party
is a just action, but not an action that is right in light of its
87. The general explanation of how clashes between the Principle of Fair-
ness-Responsibility and other principles should be resolved is included in Segev,
The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
88. See discussion supra Part III.
89. See discussion supra Part I.
90. See discussion supra Part III.A.
91. McMahan, supra note 8, at 260-63.
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consequences, that is, "because it produces a better or more
just outcome. ' But, as McMahan himself immediately notes,
it is possible to view responsibility or fault as an intrinsic
element in a consequential balance.93 It is indeed common to
refer to considerations of distribution and fairness as non-
consequential or "deontological." 9 However, considerations of
distribution and fairness, as opposed to deontological con-
strains on consequential balance, are not necessarily opposed
to consequentialism. The conflation of these different consid-
erations seems to be based on the common, but misleading,
tendency to encompass all non-utilitarian considerations un-
der the heading of deontology.
McMahan nevertheless rejects the consequentialist in-
terpretation of his idea. He argues that it could "capture our
intuitions," or "commonsense morality," only if it accepts jus-
tice as having an "absolute priority in the evaluation of out-
comes" by outweighing "all other features of the possible out-
comes."g5 This, he claims, is because, according to
"commonsense morality," a person may defend herself against
a culpable aggressor even if this would be detrimental for the
balance of the good, such as, for example, killing an aggressor
whose lethal threat has only a "relatively low" probability of
success.96 As noted above, however, this view implies a denial
of any proportionality requirement and should be rejected,
even if the "commonsense morality" endorses it.97
The second reason why McMahan considers his idea as
deontological reflects the core of standard deontology: he de-
termines which actions are justified, culpable, and excused
partly in light of standard deontological constraints on conse-
quential balance. These include the deontological prohibition
against intentionally killing an innocent person in order to
prevent the intentional killing of several innocent persons."
92. Id. at 260.
93. Theories that determine the goodness of states of affairs partly in light
of considerations of distribution and fairness-particularly in the sense of re-
sponsibility for conflicts-are sometimes described as fundamentally consequen-
tial. See SCHEFFLER, supra note 36, at 10-13, 25-36, 70-79; Kagan, supra note
8, at 48, 54.
94. See, e.g., VEATCH, supra note 46, at 35.
95. McMahan, supra note 8, at 261.
96. Id.
97. See discussion supra Part III.C.
98. McMahan, supra note 8, at 262-63. Otsuka adheres to similar deonto-
logical distinctions in this context, such as the distinctions between "killing and
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However, it should be noted that a similar prohibition might
be supported by consequentialist considerations, as well as by
a non-deontological framework of the kind suggested in this
article, if the number of individuals involved in interpersonal
conflicts is not in itself a morally significant factor in the ad-
judication of interpersonal conflicts."
3. The Equal Chance Principle versus a Presumption
against "Shifting Harms"
The different foundations of the theory suggested in this
article, including the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility, and
McMahan's fault-based principle lead to a difference in the
background principles, namely, the principles that apply
when no one is responsible for an interpersonal conflict. The
background principle is important also to cases in which
there is a person who is responsible for the existence of the
conflict, as in the paradigm case of self-defense, since, in such
cases, the responsibility-based principle clashes with the
background principle.
The background principle I suggest is the Equal Chance
Principle. On the other hand, McMahan suggests that the
background principle should be a "presumption against shift-
ing harms," which is based on his deontological assumption
that there is a moral difference between "doing" harm and
"allowing" harm to happen.' 0 This distinction is incompatible
with the non-deontological basis of this article's thesis and
particularly with the Equal Chance Principle. Moreover, as I
explain elsewhere, I believe that other possible grounds for a
presumption against shifting harms should be rejected as
well and consequently I endorse a wide interpretation of the
Equal Chance Principle that applies as the background prin-
ciple in all interpersonal conflicts. 1 '
letting die," "initiation" and "redirection" of dangers, and "using" a person and
other means of harming a person. See Otsuka, supra note 63, at 76-79, 86-88.
99. This issue is discussed in Segev, The Signiffcance of Numbers, supra
note 9.
100. McMahan, supra note 8, at 252-53. Similarly, Otsuka argues that if a
danger to one person can be prevented only by harming another it is unjustified
to act. See Otsuka, supra note 63, at 76-77.
101. This point is explained further in Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil, su-
pra note 9. This is another demonstration of the nature of the thesis proposed
in this article, which rejects deontological distinctions but replaces them with
the Equal Chance Principle that is incompatible with standard forms of conse-
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This difference is especially significant since the proposed
thesis considers the Equal Chance Principle as reflecting an
important reason for action rather than as a mere tie-
breaker.10 2 Therefore, only strong contrary reasons can out-
weigh this reason. For example, Draper argues that when
two people need an object in order to survive and one of them
is the owner of the object, the latter should be preferred. 3
On the other hand, according to the thesis I suggest, owner-
ship itself may not provide a reason that is strong enough to
outweigh the Equal Chance Principle, especially when this
principle is strong, as is the case in a conflict involving impor-
tant interests, such as life.
4. The Scope of the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility
Another important difference between the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility and the principle suggested by Mon-
tague and McMahan is their scope. The Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility relies on a choice-based conception of responsi-
bility, and therefore applies to both wrongful actions and jus-
tified actions that lead to interpersonal conflicts." On the
other hand, both Montague and McMahan limit their princi-
ples to wrongful actions. Montague refers to "fault" and to
"culpable" actions and defines these terms to include "inten-
tional, reckless or negligent" actions, namely, unjustified, and
perhaps unexcused, actions that lead to interpersonal con-
flicts. 05 Similarly, McMahan explicitly limits his principle to
morally "culpable" parties, which also connotes unjustified
and unexcused actions.0 6 However, he encounters difficulties
in trying to support this view. He explores several explana-
quentialism.
102. See discussion supra Part III.A.
103. See Draper, supra note 66, at 84-85; Kai Devlin, Justice as a Basis for
Tort Liability, 8 PUB. AFF. Q. 237, 241-42 (1994). Note, however, that owner-
ship might often be related to other relevant considerations. For example, if the
owner of the object invests resources in acquiring it, then the Principle of Fair-
ness-Responsibility might provide a reason to prefer giving the object to her.
104. Remember, however, that the force of the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility is determined by the degree of responsibility for the conflict,
which, in turn, might be affected by the question whether, or to what extent, the
relevant action is justified.
105. Montague, supra note 64, at 211; MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL
DEFENSE, supra note 65, at 40, 44-45; Phillip Montague, The Morality of Self-
Defense: A Reply to Wasserman, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 81, 84 (1989).
106. McMahan, supra note 8, at 259, 263.
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tions for the common assumption that there is a different,
supplementary justification, more limited in nature, for pre-
ferring innocent victims over innocent aggressors and inno-
cent threats, but not over innocent bystanders."' However,
he concludes that he is "unable to find a fully convincing justi-
fication" for this assumption.0 8 He suggests that the reason
for this assumption might be the tendency to "overgener-
aliz[e] from the paradigm" of a culpable aggressor, and con-
cludes that this "reveals both an incoherence in commonsense
morality and a lack of grounding for an important set of dis-
criminations in the law," which, McMahan assumes, reflects
this assumption.9
Draper's position in this respect seems closer to the one
suggested in this article. Although he initially refers to
"moral fault" or "blame," he later expands his analysis by
suggesting the following principle: if "someone justifiably and
for his own benefit creates a situation in which he or another
innocent person must sustain a cost ... fairness prefers that
the cost should fall on the individual who created this situa-
tion.""0° However, Draper seemingly intends this formula to
apply more broadly than the suggested Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility because he adopts a bias towards the status
quo by considering an effort to avoid a danger, for which the
agent is not responsible, as a benefit in the relevant sense.
Thus, Draper illustrates his principle with the following ex-
ample: a person who is justifiably acting in self-defense
strikes an undercover police officer who is trying to hit him.
According to Draper, this person benefits in the relevant
sense by his action although he acts justifiably."' The Princi-
ple of Fairness-Responsibility, on the other hand, would view
both parties in this case as equally non-responsible, provided
107. Id. at 263-90.
108. Id. at 288.
109. Id. at 288-90.
110. Draper, supra note 66, at 84.
111. Id at 84. Draper also claims that individuals who create risks to others
should compensate them, if the risks materialize, even if creating the risks was
justified and not blameworthy. See also Devlin, supra note 103, at 246-47.
Compare Otsuka, supra note 63 at 90-91 (arguing that it is justified to harm a
person who is responsible for a threat to another even if the latter is free of
blame, for example, if the threatening party mistakenly thinks that the other is
about to harm him). According to the thesis I suggest, it is unjustified to harm
persons who are innocent threats if they did not take any special risk that led to
the conflict.
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that the police officer is not responsible for the existence of
the initial danger. 112 This is not to say that the police officer
is justified in striking the other non-responsible person, but
rather that the proper course of action is to follow the Equal
Chance Principle unless the expected harm to one of the par-
ties is substantially less serious than the expected harm to
the other, in which case the Substantial Difference Principle
requires that we prefer the latter.
5. Agent-Neutral versus Agent-Relative Principles
Additional differences stem from disagreements that are
more general in nature. The principles suggested in this arti-
cle aim to provide general, agent-neutral, guidance to all
agents in the resolution of all kinds of interpersonal conflicts.
On the other hand, both Montague and McMahan make sev-
eral distinctions in this respect between different agents.
Montague claims that in standard self-defense situations,
one is "not simply permitted to kill in self-defense, but one
has a right to do so," and that a third party is "obliged to
choose in favor of the person whose life is threatened.""3 He
argues further that in other interpersonal conflicts "one is
merely at liberty to choose in favor of himself," and a third
party is "free to choose as he wishes under certain condi-
tions.""4 McMahan similarly claims that self-defense in the
strict sense (namely, an agent who defends herself) should be
"optional," because "one is not always required" to protect
herself against a culpable aggressor."5  These controversies
reflect complex issues that are beyond the scope of this arti-
cle." '6 Therefore, I will only note two points here. First, the
proposed principles are all agent-neutral, and apply equally
to all agents in all kinds of interpersonal conflicts. Second,
112. Note the exception above for the Principle of Fairness-Responsibiity
with regard to people who risk themselves in order to protect themselves or oth-
ers. See discussion supra Part III.B.
113. Montague, supra note 64, at 211.
114. Id. Seumas Miller argues that although there should be a distinction
between persons who defend themselves (who have a "right" to do so) and third
parties (who have an "obligation" to do so), Montague's view is incompatible
with this distinction. See Seumas Miller, Self-Defence and Forcing the Choice
between Lives, 9 J. OF APP. PHIL. 239, 241 (1992).
115. McMahan, supra note 8, at 261.
116. See generally Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9 (discuss-
ing some of these complex issues).
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according to the proposed principles, no substantive line
should be drawn between permissions, obligations, rights and
duties.
Another possible difference, which also raises general
questions that are beyond the scope of this article, is that the
Principle of Fairness-Responsibility applies to both benefits
and burdens, while the other three fault-based principles re-
fer only to the allocation of burdens."7 The suggested thesis
does not endorse the distinction between burdens and bene-
fits, or between changing the position of individuals for the
worse or for the better. In my opinion, these distinctions are
not morally insignificance in themselves, although there
might be practical considerations for adopting similar distinc-
tions in certain contexts.
118
C. Criticism of the Significance of Responsibility in the
Justification of Self-Defense
Despite the above differences between the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility and the other responsibility-based
principles discussed,"9 the basic idea underlying all these
principles is similar.'0 It is therefore instructive to consider
the criticisms of the other responsibility-based principles and
their relevance to the thesis of this article.
1. Fairness versus Retribution
Several critics mistakenly reject responsibility as a
ground for resolving interpersonal conflicts due to its sup-
posed "retributive character." 1 As pointed out above, the jus-
tification to prefer non-responsible over responsible persons
in interpersonal conflicts is not necessarily retributive. 2  In
117. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
118. Compare GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 222,
n.22 (1978) with KAGAN, supra note 22, at 51-55.
119. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
120. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
121. See David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
356, 372 (1987); UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 185-86; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC
CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 145 (1998) ("[L]inking the culpability of the ag-
gressor with the permissible degree of defensive force seems, however, to con-
fuse the institutions of punishment and self-defense"). Although punishment
does not necessarily reflect retribution, this remark implies an assumption of
retributive punishment since it relates punishment to culpability and contrasts
punishment with self-defense.
122. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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fact, none of the fault-based principles mentioned above is re-
tributive.123  Specifically, the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility represents a distributive consideration, based
on the concept of fairness, which reflect what is considered
the right way of allocating an unavoidable burden, and not on
a retributive notion.
124
2. The Validity of the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility
David Wasserman criticizes Montague's responsibility
principle by claiming that greater fault is neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for choosing one life over another. '25
First, Wasserman asserts that greater fault is insufficient to
justify self-defense: he argues that it is not always justified to
sacrifice the person who is most at fault in a forced-choice
situation.126 He gives several examples to demonstrate this
claim. One example involves a choice between two people
who will die without a transplant of a liver: where the first is
not responsible for his predicament, but is old and expected to
live only six months even with the new liver, and the second
is young and otherwise healthy and is expected to live thirty
years with the new liver, but is responsible for his need of a
new liver due to his excessive alcohol consumption.'27 In an-
other of Wasserman's examples, one must choose which of the
passengers of a drowning ship should be saved, after one of
them ran the ship into an iceberg, intending to kill another
man who had raped and caused the death of his daughter."8
Wasserman avoids claiming that, in these examples, it is
clearly wrong to sacrifice the responsible persons (the young
alcoholic and the rapist) rather than the non-responsible per-
sons, but he does argue that "[e]ven if we are inclined to favor
the sacrifice of the culpable parties, it is not clearly the
'dominant' solution as it is in standard self-defense" situa-
tions. 1
2 9
Wasserman second claim is that greater fault is also un-
123. See Montague, supra note 105, at 88; McMahan, supra note 8, at 259-60;
Draper, supra note 77, at 66.
124. See discussion supra Part III.B.
125. Wasserman, supra note 121, at 366-69.
126. Id. at 366.
127. Id. at 367.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 368.
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necessary to justify self-defense, as it might be justified to
sacrifice an aggressor who is not the most responsible person
for the attack.30 For example, he claims that a person who
"deliberately incites the aggressor to give himself a legal pre-
text to kill him" by "relentless insults and harassment" might
be "more culpable than the aggressor he provokes," and yet it
does not follow that we should help the aggressor if the only
options are his death or the death of the provocateur.
131
Wasserman is right that greater fault, in the sense of re-
sponsibility for the existence of an interpersonal conflict, is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for sacrificing
individuals. However, this view seems compatible with Mon-
tague's thesis, and, in any case, it is certainly compatible with
the thesis of this article and particularly with the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility. This Principle does not always jus-
tify the sacrifice of the person who is most responsible for an
interpersonal conflict, but rather holds that there is always a
reason that the person responsible for an interpersonal con-
flict should bear its cost instead of a non-responsible person.
This reason is not necessarily decisive within the framework
suggested in this article. On the contrary, since it might con-
flict with other reasons for action, incorporated in the other
proposed principles, the resolution of interpersonal conflicts
in which this reason is applicable depends on its force relative
to the force of the other applicable conflicting considera-
tions.'32
This may be demonstrated in the examples given by
Wasserman himself. Although there is indeed room for hesi-
tation with respect to the resolution of all three examples,
this does not undermine the thesis suggested in this article
and particularly the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility. On
the contrary, in all of these examples there is a reason that
the persons responsible for the situation will be sacrificed
rather than each of the other, non-responsible, persons. How-
ever, in all three examples, this reason is weaker than in the
paradigm case of self-defense," and since it sometimes
130. Id. at 366.
131. Wasserman, supra note 121, at 368.
132. See discussion supra Part III.
133. With respect to the ship example, Michael Gorr asserts that the "justifi-
cation for killing those whom Wasserman terms 'past aggressors' is every bit as
strong as our justification for killing present aggressors (all else equal)." See
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clashes with other reasons, it is not necessarily decisive in
these cases. Particularly, the following points should be
taken into account with respect to the relative force of the
competing reasons in these examples.
First, in all three examples, the responsibility of the "cul-
pable parties" for the conflict is much weaker than that of a
typical aggressor. This is most obvious in the ship example
where the father is described as "[o]vercome with rage." 'M
This is also true in the transplant example, in which it is rea-
sonable to assume that the young person did not cause his
illness and thus the conflict deliberately, but only negligently
or, at most, recklessly. As for the third example, provocation
is a classic ground for considering persons less responsible for
aggression and, consequently, less culpable (although provo-
cation is typically considered as a basis for mitigation of pun-
ishment, its effect on responsibility is also relevant to the no-
tion of fairness that relies on responsibility).' Thus, in all
three examples, the reason to sacrifice the responsible person
is significantly weaker than in standard self-defense situa-
tions. If these diminishing factors were not present, this rea-
son would be as strong as in a typical case of aggression.'36
Second, in the provocation example there is room for
doubt the validity of the comparative judgment that a person
who provokes another, even by "relentless insults and har-
assment,"'37 is more culpable than a person who reacts to such
a provocation in a way that forces a choice between their
lives. This doubt is especially strong with respect to culpabil-
ity in the relevant respect, that is, responsibility for the exis-
tence of the conflict of lives. In fact, it seems that the con-
trary might well be true. The provocateur's character might
well be profoundly flawed, and he is certainly responsible for
Gorr, supra note 6, at 265. This proposition is too strong, as explained in the
text.
134. Wasserman, supra note 121, at 367.
135. But see generally JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
(1992) (providing a critical analysis of the relation between provocation and re-
sponsibility).
136. With respect to the ship example, see Montague, supra note 105, at 82-
83. Moreover, as pointed out by Gorr, in real life versions of the examples in
which the responsibility is not exhibited at the time the conflict needs to be re-
solved, there might be doubts with respect to the reliability of the evidence that
the persons are indeed responsible for the conflict. See Gorr, supra note 6, at
265.
137. Wasserman, supra note 121, at 368.
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the conflict to a significant extent. However, it seems that a
person who faces mere insults, and no physical danger, but
nevertheless chooses to react with deadly force bears more re-
sponsibility for the existence of the situation in which a choice
must be made between his life or that of the person who in-
sulted him.138
Finally, in the transplant example, this article's thesis
suggests that - in addition to the reason entailed by the Prin-
ciple of Fairness-Responsibility, to prefer the young, respon-
sible person over the old, non-responsible person - there is
also a contrary reason, based on the Importance Principle, to
prefer the young person who will live with the new liver for
thirty additional years, to the old person, who will live with it
only six more months. This is so since it is reasonable to
elaborate the Importance Principle so that, other things being
equal, the interest of a person in living for thirty additional
years would be considered as more important than the inter-
est of a person in living for only an additional six months.
Admittedly, this interpretation of the Importance Principle is
controversial because it raises complex questions about the
value of life.'39 However, it does seem a plausible interpreta-
tion. And, if this interpretation is indeed correct, it supports
saving the younger person on the ground that his interest in
getting the transplant is stronger."'4 If this interpretation is
indeed correct, there are, in the above example, two, clashing
considerations: the reason to prefer the non-responsible older
person and the reason to prefer the person who will benefit
most from the transplant. It is hard to determine the relative
force of these competing considerations. But the presence of
the contrary reason to prefer the young person explains why
at least some people feel a dilemma in the transplant exam-
ple. If there is indeed such a contrary reason, it affects the
overall judgment concerning the example without casting
doubt on the validity of the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility, that is, on the idea that there is a reason to
prefer the old as the non-responsible party.
138. See Montague, supra note 105, at 86.
139. This issue is discussed in Segev, Well-Being and Fairness in the Distri-
bution of Scarce Health Resources, supra note 9.
140. Montague seems to make the same point when he claims that the harm
to the young person is more severe than the harm to the old. See Montague,
supra note 105, at 85.
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3. The Principle of Fairness-Responsibility and
Deontological Constraints
Suzanne Uniacke raises a related, but distinct, criticism
against the notion of responsibility as a basis for resolving in-
terpersonal conflict:
The fact that someone has culpably endangered another
person's life does not give me a positive right to sacrifice
the culpable party, if necessary, as a means of saving the
victim. For example, I have no right to remove a crimi-
nal's heart or kidneys on the grounds that I can put these
organs to good use in saving someone else. This is so even
if the criminal has, through a prior culpable attack,
caused the intended recipient to require a transplant.1
4
1
Uniacke acknowledges, however, "that in other circum-
stances, where (say) two people are endangered and both
cannot be saved, the fact that one party has culpably endan-
gered the other can be a legitimate ground on which to dis-
criminate against the culpable party."4 1 Uniacke does not
explicitly explain the difference between the two cases, but it
appears that her view is that the idea that responsibility
should affect the resolution of interpersonal conflicts should
be limited by deontological, agent-relative constraints, which
forbid positively harming persons regardless of other consid-
erations, most notable consequential considerations but per-
haps also other, non-consequential, considerations.
This criticism of the idea that responsibility should affect
the resolution of interpersonal conflicts is, however, mis-
guided.
The first point that it is important to emphasize is that
even if we assume that there are valid deontological consid-
erations, such as the distinction between positively harming
persons and saving persons from harm, this does not under-
mine the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility, for several rea-
sons. First, it should be remembered that the Principle of
Fairness-Responsibility states that there is a reason to prefer
a non-responsible person to a responsible one, rather than
that this reason is necessarily and therefore always decisive.
Therefore, the validity of principle could not be undermined
by the claim that there are also other valid considerations, in-
141. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 188-89 (internal citations omitted).
142. Id.
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cluding deontological consideration, such as the distinction
between positively harming and not helping. Generally, the
existence of a certain consideration does not annul other con-
siderations, but rather implies that there are several perti-
nent considerations in certain cases.
This observation is often overlooked due to the tendency
to describe deontological considerations as "absolute," a ten-
dency which is reinforced by common expressions such as
"there are things that one must not do regardless of the con-
sequences" or "rights are trumps."14 3 However, even if deonto-
logical considerations are decisive, this does not imply that
other considerations are not valid. It could only imply that
other considerations would be outweighed by deontological
considerations whenever both kinds of considerations are pre-
sent and therefore these other considerations would not affect
the practical decision in these cases.
Moreover, it is also important to bear in mind that even if
deontological considerations are valid they are not necessarily
decisive. Indeed, it seems that even those who support deon-
tological considerations do not typically consider them as ab-
solute.
The second point that should be emphasized is that, even
if deontological considerations are not only valid but also "ab-
solute," namely, outweigh all other considerations in all the
cases in which they apply, the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility can not only be relevant but can even be deci-
sive in other cases, in which deontological consideration do
not apply, like in Uniacke's example of the two endangered
persons that only one of whom can be saved and only one of
whom is responsible for the danger threatening the other.
Finally, it should be noted that it is not at all clear that
there are valid deontological constrains such as those based
on the distinction between positively harming and not help-
ing. To be sure, there is a natural repulsion from harming
persons positively, especially when this involves removal of
their vital organs and thereby killing them, as in the heart
variation of Uniacke's transplant example. This repulsion
explains why it is easier to accept the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility when the question is which endangered person
to save when not all can be saved, rather than whether to
143. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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positively kill one person in order to save another. However,
it is difficult to identify a cogent normative basis for distin-
guishing the two situations." Indeed, even some of those
who believe that there is a morally significant difference be-
tween killing and letting die acknowledge that it is difficult to
rationally defend this distinction.'45
The assumption underlining the thesis suggested in this
article is that there are no valid deontological considerations
and particularly that the difference between positively harm-
ing and not helping is not in itself a morally insignificant
one.'46 Accordingly, I believe that the Principle of Fairness-
Responsibility is universal, namely, apply to all interpersonal
conflicts. According to the proposed thesis, if a person is re-
sponsible for endangering the life of another, and the only
way to save the latter involves sacrificing the former by posi-
tively harming him, there is a reason to do so and, if there are
no other pertinent considerations, or if there are only weaker
applicable considerations, it is justified to positively sacrifice
a responsible person in order to save a non-responsible per-
147
son.
4. Former versus Present Responsibility
After arguing against responsibility as both a sufficient
and a necessary condition for preferring one individual to an-
other in the resolution of interpersonal conflicts,
Wasserman's suggests his own responsibility-based view of
the justification of self-defense. Wasserman's view is based
on what he considers the morally significant distinction be-
tween a person who is responsible for a conflict due to an act
that had already been completed, at the time the conflict is
resolved, and present aggressor whose responsibility is exhib-
ited at the time the conflict is resolved. He argues that it
144. Various grounds for distinguishing the two kinds of cases are examined
and rejected in Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
145. See Jeff McMahan, Kiling, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid, 103
ETHICS 250, 279 (1993) (arguing that although the considerations underlying
the deontological distinction between killing and letting die are not cogent, the
intuitive force of this distinction is so strong that it is impossible to imagine mo-
rality without them).
146. See discussion supra Part III.A.
147. Note that, according to the proposed thesis, it is the responsibility for
the danger, rather then the fact that the responsible person is a "criminal,"
which is the relevant consideration.
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might be justified to harm the latter in self-defense, but not
the former.
148
However, Wasserman fails to explain persuasively why
this distinction is morally significant. 4 1 While one's responsi-
bility for the existence of an interpersonal conflict seems to be
of obvious moral significance (although it is not necessarily
decisive), the time when such responsibility accrues lacks ap-
parent normative significance. Time may be important only
as an indication of responsibility. When responsibility is ex-
hibited in present aggression, i.e., at the time the conflict is
resolved, the agent, who has to resolve the conflict, typically
has relatively clear evidence of the identity of the responsible
person and the nature of her responsibility. On the other
hand, typically the agent will have less evidence of prior re-
sponsibility. ° This evidentiary difference explains the hesi-
tation to harm "prospective aggressors" pointed out by
Wasserman, while casting doubt on his argument for the in-
dependent moral significance of present aggression. 5'
In support of his distinction between present and former
responsibility, Wasserman also briefly suggests an idea of
"deontology of the moment," according to which "a person has
significantly greater responsibility for his present than for his
past actions."'52 However, this assertion, which is not sup-
ported by further argument, is also unpersuasive.
5. Justification versus Evading Responsibility
Seumas Miller also criticizes Montague's suggestion that
fault is relevant in the adjudication of interpersonal con-
flicts.'53 He claims that it is based on the mistaken idea "that
the attacker by forcing the choice on the defender is somehow
responsible for his own death."" However, there is no indica-
tion that Montague had this idea in mind when he formulated
148. Wasserman, supra note 121, at 371-77.
149. See Gorr, supra note 6, at 267 ("[I]n the absence of some supporting ar-
gument, there is simply no reason to take such an extremely counterintuitive
view seriously."). Uniacke accepts the requirement of present aggression, in
light of her view discussed in the next section, but rejects the arguments offered
for it by Wasserman. See UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 185.
150. See Gorr, supra note 6, at 265.
151. Wasserman, supra note 121, at 373-74.
152. Id. at 375-76.
153. Miller, supra note 114, at 240-41.
154. Id.
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his suggestion. In any case, this is not the idea underlying
this article's thesis: the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility is
not based on the idea that the responsibility of the aggressor
for the conflict relieves the defender from responsibility for
her action. Instead, the idea is that, a rational agent should
consider the aggressor's responsibility as a morally significant
factor in the resolution of the conflict. The significance of re-
sponsibility is not in that it relieves the agent from responsi-
bility but rather in that it provides a reason to prefer the in-
terests of a non-responsible person to the interests of a
responsible person.155
A similar argument, from a different perspective, is made
by Cheyney Ryan. He argues that no justification for self-
defense is needed, because while the attacker is responsible
for a "situation in which someone's life will be lost," the victim
"is not responsible for this situation, it is merely presented to
him."56 This argument is misguided for the same reason.
Harming an aggressor is an action that requires justification,
whether it is performed by the person who is being attacked
or by a third person. Although the aggressor forces a choice,
this does not relieve the person who harms him from respon-
sibility for his action. Therefore, a justification for this harm
is required. As suggested above, it could and should be justi-
fied with reference to the aggressor's responsibility for the ex-
istence of the conflict.157 But there is a difference between
evading responsibility for harm and justifying harm. Justifi-
cation of harm assumes, rather than denies, responsibility for
it.
6. Justiication versus Desciption
Miller criticizes Montague's notion of responsibility, as a
basis for self-defense, by arguing that while the responsibility
of the aggressor for the attack is a morally significant factor,
it does not justify self-defense, since it is merely another de-
scription of the situation, and, as a mere description, it lacks
155. See discussion supra Part III.
156. Cheyney C. Ryan, Self-Defense, Pacifism, and the Possibility of Kling,
93 ETHiCS 508, 515-16 (1983). Ryan also raises the possibility that the mere
fact that an attacker causes a situation in which a choice needs to be made-
even if he caused it innocently-is enough to justify harming him. But, as he
himself acknowledges, "it is difficult to imagine what positive grounds could be
given for this principle." See id. at 516-17.
157. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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normative force.' But this criticism too is unfounded. The
notion of responsibility, as reflected in Montague's theory and
in the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility is not an empirical
description of a situation but rather a normative idea, which
gives preference to the person who is not responsible for a
conflict over a person who is. This principle might require
additional argument, but it is obviously not merely a descrip-
tive one.
7. Responsibility and Intention
Finally, Miller criticizes Montague's suggestion on the
ground that, in referring only to the fact that the aggressor
forces a choice on the agent between the aggressor himself
and the defender, it ignores a crucial factor: the aggressor's
intention to attack, and harm, another. These factors, he con-
tinues, are distinct since a choice could be forced unknowingly
and both should be taken into account.'59
The gist of this criticism is unclear. If it attempts to dis-
tinguish between a causal and a choice-based conception of
responsibility, it is, in my opinion, valid. However, such an
interpretation does not undermine Montague's view, which
specifically refers to a culpability-based conception, rather
than to a causal conception, of responsibility. Similarly, this
interpretation does not undermine the thesis suggested in
this article, which adopts a choice-based conception of respon-
sibility and, accordingly, distinguishes between responsible
and non-responsible persons even though the latter could too
be "forcing a choice" in some (causal) sense.
Moreover, the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility re-
flects degrees of responsibility in evaluating the force of the
reason it incorporates." The force of the reason to prefer the
non-responsible, or the less responsible, person varies in ac-
cordance with the degree of responsibility of the other respon-
sible or more responsible person. Therefore, according to this
conception, causing a conflict intentionally involves a greater
degree of responsibility than doing so, for example, acciden-
tally or even negligently.
158. Miller, supra note 114, at 240-41.
159. Id. at 241.
160. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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V. NON-RESPONSIBILITY-BASED AccouNTs OF SELF-
DEFENSE
This section compares the proposed justification for self-
defense to several other dominant justifications of self-
defense, which, unlike the theories discussed in the previous
section, do not rely on the notion of (choice-based) responsibil-
ity, and then explains why the proposed justification is supe-
rior to these views.
I will not discuss all possible accounts of self-defense.
Particularly, I will not explore several other accounts of self-
defense that relate to the basic assumptions of the proposed
theory. I put aside agent-relative accounts of self-defense
that are based on the idea that agents are permitted to prefer
their interests to those of others.' Second, I ignore the deon-
tological claim that self-defense is justified since it does not
involve intending harm (or evil) in light of the principle of
double effect. 62 Third, I do not discuss utilitarian accounts of
self-defense. And, finally, I mostly disregard contractual ac-
counts of self-defense." As noted above,"M and explained
more fully elsewhere,'65 the proposed thesis is agent-neutral,
rejects deontological distinctions, is not utilitarian and does
not rest on contractual ideas.
161. For agent-relative conceptions of self-defense, see Jeremy Waldron, Self-
Defense: Agent-Neutral and Agent-Relative Accounts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 711
(2000). The possibility of an agent-relative justification for self-defense is also
mentioned by Nancy Davis with respect to conflicts between innocent parties.
She argues that since there is no moral difference between the persons involved
in such conflicts, the only basis for preferring one person over the other is an
agent-relative permission for each to prefer his interests (although the well-
being of each is equally important and it is not fairer to prefer one to the other).
See Davis, supra note 79, at 188-94.
162. For an analysis of the applicability of the principle of double effect to
self-defense, see KAGAN, supra note 22, at 132-44; UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 92-
155.
163. For a brief discussion of the nature of such accounts, see KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHIcS, supra note 8, at 251-52. For a relativist contractual ac-
count of self-defense see Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL.
REV. 3, 9, 14-15 (1975) (morality is an unconscious and implicit agreement be-
tween a group of people to adhere to certain principles and the rights to self-
defense and self-preservation derive their relative moral force from the fact that
people cannot rationally form the intention not to defend themselves against
aggression). See also discussion infra Part V.A.3.
164. See discussion supra Part III.
165. Segev, The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9. For a rejection of
agent-relative justifications for self-defense on other grounds, see McMahan,
supra note 8, at 268-71.
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Another preliminary point that should be noted concerns
accounts of self-defense that rely on the concept of "lesser
evil."'66 In its most rudimentary sense, the concept of lesser
evil - namely, the idea that it is sometimes justified to posi-
tively harm or to sacrifice the interest of one person in order
to prevent harm to another-is merely an empty framework,
which lack any substantive content and could accommodate
any normative theory, including the thesis suggested in this
article and the other theories discussed in it. Therefore, ac-
counts of self-defense that rely on the notion of lesser evil in
this general form are not helpful. However, the concept of
lesser evil is often understood more narrowly to reflect a spe-
cific moral theory, most commonly, a utilitarian conception.
67
This interpretation is misguided to the extent that it implies
that utilitarianism is the only possible foundation for the ru-
dimentary concept of lesser evil.
The self-defense theories explored at length in this sec-
tion include rights-based accounts,'16 accounts that rely on a
comparison of the value of the interests of aggressors relative
to the value of the interests of the persons they attack, 169 and
accounts that are based on the causal responsibility, most no-
tably the notion of intrusion.7 ° These theories provide vari-
ous interpretations of the rudimentary concept of lesser evil
in the context of self-defense, that are different from the one
suggested in this article.
A. Theories ofRights
Rights-based accounts of self-defense typically assume
that persons have rights to life, bodily integrity, property and
other interests, which include, at least, the right that others
will not positively harm these interests. 7' Self-defense then
166. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 857-60
(Little, Brown & Co. 1978); ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 69-72; Omichinski, su-
pra note 7, at 1452-53 (all mentioning the concept of lesser evil as a possible ra-
tionale for self-defense).
167. For associations of the concept of lesser evil with utilitarianism, see gen-
erally FLETCHER, supra note 166, at 790-91; Omichinski, supra note 7, at 1456,
1458.
168. See discussion infi-a Part V.A.
169. See discussion infra Part V.B.
170. See discussion infr-a Part V.C.
171. See Bedau, supra note 7, at 559 ("[T]he right of self-defense, according to
all Natural Rights theorists, including Blackstone, is simply a special case of
the right to life."). For Blackstone's understanding of the right to life, as one
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is justified, according to these accounts, as a protection of the
relevant rights from attack. 172
Reliance on the notion of rights involves three main pre-
liminary problems, in my opinion.'73 First, the notion of
rights blurs the basic question of the justification of actions-
whether actions properly reflect all relevant reasons for ac-
tions-by focusing instead on issues such as whether actions
violate duties or rights. This is so since the concepts of duties
and rights are significant when they are understood as primal
concepts, which precede and affect the issue of justification of
actions, as opposed to merely represent conclusions concern-
ing justification in certain terminology. Second, I believe that
the notion of rights should be rejected if understood as a fun-
damental moral concept that deviates from the idea that in-
dividual well-being is the fundamental value. I suggest that
the value of individual well-being should be supplemented or
adjudicated in light of considerations of fairness, but not re-
placed by other, competing, fundamental values, such as du-
ties and rights. Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the
context of self-defense, rights-based accounts often fail to ex-
plain the foundations of the alleged rights. Particularly,
rights-based accounts of self-defense typically assume that
self-defense is justified rather than explain why this is the
case.
74
component of "the right of personal security," which includes also the protection
of "limbs," "body," "health," and "reputation," see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
Commentaries *129.
172. 1 ignore the problem of identifying the relevant right. For this problem,
see Kaufman, supra note 5, at 23:
The dilemma for the rights theory is that any single purported right
which is broad enough to cover all or most of the situations in which de-
fensive force is justified will be too open-ended to be helpful. Yet sim-
ply to assert a list of distinct rights to justify distinct uses of defensive
force is no more helpful, as it provides no unifying explanatory account,
but only an ad hoc list.
173. See Segev, The Concept of Lesser Eiil, supra note 9 (for a further expla-
nation of these points).
174. For skepticism with respect to the explanatory power of the concept of
rights in the context of self-defense, see W. A. Parent, Judith Thomson and the
Logic of Rigbts, 37 PHIL. STuD. 405-17 (1980) ("while the explanatory force of
rights per se is problematic, they are nevertheless useful rhetorical devices by
which to spur moral argumentation on potentially important issues"); Kaufman,
supra note 5, at 20 ("whatever might be the correct account of self-defense,
rights theory will not do-it is at best unhelpful, and at worse positively perni-
cious as an explanation of the permissibility of defensive force"; id, at 26 "[Olne
cannot avoid a deep suspicion of circularity. What is the direction of explana-
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Rights-based accounts of self-defense may be classified in
accordance with their answer to a basic question that faces
every theory aimed at justifying self-defense based on the no-
tion of rights, namely, why protecting the rights of individu-
als by thwarting attacks is not forbidden as a violation of the
attackers' equivalent rights. The first answer to this question
is that while individuals generally have a right not to be
harmed, attackers lack this right. Variations of this answer
differ in the explanation they offer as to why and when,
namely, with respect to which attackers, this is the case.'75
The second answer is that, like people in general, attackers
have a right not to be harmed. However, this right clashes
with the equivalent right of the people they attack. According
to this account, this clash should be resolved in favor of the
latter, since their rights are more important and thus over-
ride those of the attackers. Variations of this answer again
differ in the explanation they offer as to why and when this is
tion in the rights account? Is it that our intuitions about rights and the condi-
tions of forfeiture can explain the principles of self-defense, or rather vice
versa?"); Ryan, supra note 156, at 515 ("any argument pro or con which hinges
on the issue of rights is likely to get us nowhere"); Wasserman, supra note 121,
at 362 ("even if self-defense can be derived from a right to life, that derivation
seems artificial and needlessly oblique"); Gorr, supra note 6, at 268 ("[F]or what
is 'the right to life' other than a compendium of logically independent rights in
terms of which it is explicated?"). Indeed, even Thomson, who relies extensively
on the notion of rights in general, and has persistently explored various rights-
based justifications for self-defense in particular, recognizes-both in general
and in the context of self-defense-the lack of a satisfactory theory of rights
seems to acknowledge that language of rights simply expresses normative con-
clusions. See Thomson, supra note 20, at 149 ("I think there does not exist any
even remotely plausible theory of the logic of rights."); Judith Jarvis Thomson,
A/erward, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK-ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 253
(William Parent ed., 1986) ("to have a right just is its being the case that people
may and may not treat you in these and those ways"); id. at 260 ("we do not yet
fully understand how the concept 'has a right to' itself works"); Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, in RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK-ESSAYS
IN MORAL THEORY 47-48 (William Parent ed., 1986):
It is arguable that if there is to be any point at all in appealing to
rights in such discussions, there had better be something independent
of permissibilities and impermissibilities which fixes their existence
and degree of stringency. It is not obvious that this is true. It might be
that to attribute a right is only to talk about permissibilities and im-
permissibilities, but in a way that groups or collects them, and brings
whole clusters of cases to bear on each other ... We stand in need of an
account of just how an appeal to a right may be thought to function in
ethical discussion.
175. See discussion infra Part V.A.1.
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the case.17 The third answer to the above question differs in
nature and rests on the idea that the right to self-defense is
against the state.77 Each of these answers is considered in
turn.
1. Do Attackers Lack the Right Not To Be Harmed?
a. Justification for Harm and Rights
One explanation why attackers lack the right not to be
harmed is that persons have only the right not to be harmed
unjustifiably, and that harming attackers in self-defense does
not violate this right as harm in self-defense is justified. This
view is sometimes called the "specification" view of rights.'78
The problem is that this account most obviously begs the
question of justification: it clearly assumes that self-defense is
justified rather than explain why this is so."'
b. Forfeiture and Loss oflPaghts
A second variation of the view that aggressors do not
have a right to life, bodily integrity, liberty or other pertinent
interests, and therefore do not have a right not to be harmed
with respect to these interests, is based on the idea that per-
sons can forfeit these rights by their own conduct.' Accord-
176. See discussion infra Part V.A.2.
177. See discussion infra Part V.A.3.
178. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
47, 57 (1971); Parent, supra note 174, at 405-17 (labeling this account the
.moral specification" view of rights).
179. See Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 174, at 37-39;
Wasserman, supra note 121, at 362; Ryan, supra note 156, at 513. Indeed, even
William Parent-who defends this view, although only by pointing out flaws in
other accounts of rights-acknowledges that (like any theory of rights, in his
opinion) it does not offer a justification of actions. See Parent, supra note 174,
at 417.
180. The idea that rights, including the right to life, can be forfeited by a
wrongful or criminal act (though not voluntarily alienated) is mentioned by
John Locke and by William Blackstone in various contexts. Locke mentions it,
for example, when he writes, while explicating the institution of slavery, that a
person could "by his fault, forfeit his own Life, by some act that deserves
Death." John Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil Government in Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT 284 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Blackstone simi-
larly writes that life may be 'frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws of
society, which are enforced by the sanction of capital punishment." See gener-
ally 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *133; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *178. For analysis of Blackstone's view, regarding forfeiture of
rights and its applicability to self-defense, see Bedau, supra note 7, at 567-68.
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ing to a narrow version of this view, attackers forfeit their
rights to the relevant interests, and thus their right to be free
of harm, by unjustifiably, and culpably, attacking and endan-
gering others.' A broader version of this view is that indi-
viduals forfeit or lose their right to life, and thus their right
not to be killed, if they pose "an unjust immediate threat to
another person's life or proportionate interest."8 ' This view is
boarder since it includes not only culpable aggressors but also
blameless aggressors and even people who do not act at all
but merely pose involuntary or passive threats, "provided the
threat sufficiently resembles an assault, a clear case being
Nozick's man thrown down the well."183
The broad version of the view that attackers lack the
right to be free of harm is offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson
and elaborated by Uniacke. Both authors begin with the as-
sertion that, other things being equal, every person has a
right to life, which entails, inter alia, a right, against every
other person, not to be killed. This right, they continue, gen-
erally forbids the killing of persons, even if this is the only
way to save the lives of others. However, they claim that
there is an exception to this rule: persons who attack others
or constitute threats (according to Uniacke: "unjust immedi-
ate threats") to others, whether culpably or innocently, violate
the right of others not to be killed. Therefore, such attackers
lose their right not to be killed. Consequently, the authors
conclude, it is justified to kill aggressors and people who con-
stitute threats, regardless of whether they are responsible for
attack or threat under a choice-based conception of responsi-
bility, in order to protect the persons who are being attacked
181. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The Killing of the Innocent, 57 THE MONIST 527,
547 (1973) ("those attacking have by the attack forfeited certain of their
rights"); Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life,
7 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 93, 103-04, 111-12 (1978) (the forfeiture idea should be con-
trasted with the idea that killing innocent threats, such as "innocent shields," is
justified but involves an infringement, although not a violation, of their right to
life); A. J. Ashworth, Self-Defence and the Right to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282,
288-89, 294 (1975) (making both the claim that attackers' rights are forfeited
and the claim that they are overridden, without distinguishing between them);
KAGAN, supra note 8, at 173 ("we might say that although each of us has a right
not to be harmed, if I unjustifiably attack another I forfeit my right"); Omichin-
ski, supra note 7, at 1461 (the forfeiture of rights account of self-defense applies
only to culpable aggressors and not to innocent attackers).
182. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 196.
183. Id. at 229.
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or endangered by them. This exception, they explain, does
not generally apply to bystanders who are not related to the
attack or threat, although harming them might be justified
based on other exceptions to the rule against harming and
particularly killing people.' Thomson and Uniacke both con-
sider this view as essentially equivalent to the forfeiture the-
185
ory.
c. The Problem with Forfeiture and Loss Accounts
The accounts of self-defense that rely on the idea that at-
tackers lose, forfeit, or otherwise lack the right not to be
harmed, could be based on two background assumptions.
First, these accounts could provide a complete justification for
self-defense if the assumption is that it is permissible to per-
form any action that does not violate rights of persons. Al-
ternatively, and more plausibly, these accounts can provide
merely as a partial justification for self-defense, based on the
view that "the fact that someone does not have a right to life
does not itself give me a positive right to inflict lethal force on
him or her."'86 Under this view, the idea of loss or forfeiture of
rights is nevertheless part of the justification of self-defense
since it removes one moral constraint on harming individu-
als-their rights-and thus explains why self-defense does
not wrong aggressors and is therefore an exception to the
general prohibition on harming persons.' 7 In other words,
"the fact that an aggressor loses his right not to be harmed is
not a reason to harm him-it simply removes one moral ob-
stacle to harming him."'88 This account therefore does not
purport to justify self-defense in itself. It merely suggests
184. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1991);
UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 156, 209-27 (noting the similarity of her view and
Thomson's). In other places, Thomson suggests that it is also justified to kill
innocent shields of threats. See Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note
174, at 38; THOMSON, supra note 10, 370-71; but see UNIACKE, supra note 4, at
160-72.
185. Uniacke considers this variation "as theoretically on a par" with a the-
ory of forfeiture of rights. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 195. In her words, "there
need be no substantive difference" between them. Id. at 208-09. Thomson
writes that at least culpable aggressors "forfeit" their right not to be killed and
that the crucial common factor is the lack of that right, whether it is through
forfeiture or otherwise. Thomson, Self-Defense, supra note 184, at 301.
186. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 191.
187. Id. at 191-92, 203-04.
188. Draper, supra note 66, at 88.
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that if there is a different, independent justification to harm
attackers in self-defense, we should not be concerned about
their rights.
On the other hand, the first account, that does purport to
provide a complete justification for self-defense, raises an ob-
vious concern. This account seem to imply that, since culpa-
ble as well as innocent aggressors and innocent threats lose
their rights not to be harmed, their well-being or interests are
of no value and deserve no consideration. For if having cer-
tain rights is a necessary (albeit not necessarily a sufficient)
condition to the moral status of individuals, then those who
lack the required rights are deprived of any moral status.
This entailment seems misguided; even if aggressors deserve
less consideration in the resolution of the interpersonal con-
flicts they are responsible for, it is implausible to regard them
as lacking any moral status.8 9
In particular, if the prohibition against harming people
relies at least in part on the right of individual not to be
harmed, and if aggressors and persons who constitute threats
lack this right, there seems to be no reason why such aggres-
sors and threats would not be harmed gratuitously and with-
out limits."9 ° Therefore, the view that aggressors and threats
lack the right not to be harmed appears incompatible with the
idea that there must be good reasons for harming persons and
with the requirements that only necessary and proportional
force should be used in self-defense. After all, if aggressors
and persons who constitute threats lack rights, and if rights
are at least part of the basis for the prohibition on harming
persons, it seems that there is no bar to harming them with-
out good reason and to using unnecessary and disproportion-
ate force against them.
Thus, commentators have criticized the forfeiture theory
on the ground that it unwarrantably finds it justified for
agents who are unaware of the attack, and thus act without a
189. A more radical, but unexplained, criticism is that it "is inconsistent for
society to acknowledge the right to life as supremely important and then render
a wrongdoer's life as worthless." See Omichinski, supra note 7, at 1466.
190. See Bedau, supra note 7, at 570 ("to say [a person] can forfeit [his right
to life] is to say ... [he] can justifiably be killed or left to die because now (on
account of what he has done) he no longer merits our consideration"); Kaufman,
supra note 5, at 23. This is indeed the implication of the assertion, made by
Murphy, that since attackers forfeit their rights "there is no conflict" in "inter-
fering with them." See Murphy, supra note 181, at 547.
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good reason, to harm aggressors."' Similarly, critics also
fault the forfeiture theory because it condones those who act
beyond the extent needed to repel the attack.9 2 It was also
argued that the same point applies to the view that there is a
deontological constraint against doing harm, which does not
apply to aggressors.
As explained above, the idea behind this criticism applies
more widely. First, it undermines any account of self-defense
that is based on the claim that attackers lack rights that pre-
vent other persons from harming them. Therefore, this criti-
cism applies not only against the forfeiture theory but also
against the specification variation of the view that attackers
do not have the right not to be harmed. Second, this criticism
applies not only to the requirement to use only necessary
force, but also the requirement to use only proportional
force."' If aggressors lack the right not to be harmed, at least
during the attack, why is it unjustified to harm them regard-
less of the relative importance of the competing interests (i.e.,
the interest of the person attacked to avoid the harm the ag-
gressor might cause her and the interest of the aggressor to
avoid the harm necessary to prevent him for causing this
harm)?
191. See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 144-45.
192. For example, after the attack is over or when it could be stopped by less
harmful, and perhaps non-harmful, means (this point was noted also by Thom-
son herself in a previous article). See Sanford Kadish, Respect for Life and Re-
gard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CAL. L. REV. 871, 884 (1976); Thomson,
Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 174, at 34-37; Parent, supra note 174, at
412-13, 415-16; Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in
Search of a Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 454 (1982);
Wasserman, supra note 121, at 361; Ryan, supra note 156, at 511-12; Draper,
supra note 66, at 87-88; Omichinski, supra note 7, at 1456, 1466; Kaufman, su-
pra note 5, at 24, 25-26. Compare to Kagan's rejection of the suggestion that
self-defense against culpable aggressors is justified since it does not involve in-
tending evil on the ground that this view permits the employment of unneces-
sary force. See KAGAN, supra note 22, at 136-37.
193. See Kagan, supra note 8, at 92-93 ("if the constraint against doing harm
simply didn't apply in cases where the person being harmed is a deliberate ag-
gressor, then neither of these requirements [that limit self-defense to the use of
necessary and proportional force], would make any sense").
194. Both Thomson and Uniacke endorse the proportional force requirement,
even with respect to culpable aggressors. See Thomson, Self-Defense and
Rights, supra note 174, at 285-86, 301 (it is justified to kill an aggressor in order
to save another's life or to prevent a "very grave bodily harm" to another, but
not in order to prevent a theft of a "wallet or hat"); UNIACKE, supra note 4, at
143-55, 213, 229.
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One answer is that aggressors lack the right not to be
harmed only to the extent necessary to stop their attack and
prevent the danger it poses. 95 In other words, according to
this reply, aggressors and persons who constitute threats re-
tain the right not to be harmed when harming them is unnec-
essary.' This argument may be expanded to accommodate
also a requirement of proportionality, which is applicable at
the time an aggressor constitutes a risk. It might be claimed
that aggressors lose or forfeit their right not to be harmed
only to the extent that is needed for proportional protection,
and retain the right not to be harmed in a non-proportional
'97
way.
The problem with this answer is that the limitations it
places on the implications of the loss or forfeiture of the rights
of aggressors seem ad hoc, since there is no explanation as to
why the loss or forfeiture of the relevant rights is revoked
along the lines they suggest (so that only necessary and pro-
portional force is justified in self-defense).
A variation of the above answer is sometimes applied to
the right to life. According to this view, aggressors lose or for-
feit important rights only when their aggression threatens an
important interest. For example, William Blackstone writes
that aggressors forfeit their right to life only when they are
expected to use lethal force or perform another crime punish-
able by death. According to this view, when aggressors are
expected to perform only lesser harms (and, consequently, of-
fenses), they retain their right to life (although they might
forfeit lesser rights) and therefore could not be justifiably
killed in self-defense.9 Blackstone suggests this explanation
195. This answer is suggested by Ashworth and Uniacke. Ashworth, supra
note 181, at 289; UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 213.
196. Ashworth, supra note 181, at 289; UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 213.
197. This indeed seems to be the unarticulated assumption behind the views
of Ashworth and Uniacke. See Ashworth, supra note 181, at 296 (stating that
the principle of proportionality is entailed by the attackers' right to life); id. at
303 ("a criminal whose offense merely concerns property has a stronger claim to
retain his right to life and physical security than one whose endeavour involves
violence"); UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 196 (discussing the view that individuals
forfeit their right to life if they pose "an unjust immediate threat to another per-
son's life or proportionate interest").
198. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *133 (stating that life may
be "frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws of society, which are en-
forced by the sanction of capital punishment"); Omichinski, supra note 7, at
1454-55 (citing Blackstone as an example for this position).
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with reference to the law of eighteenth-century England, but
one may interpret his view to state a broader principle that
refers to the penalties determined by each legal system's pre-
vailing law. It is also plausible to interpret this view as as-
suming that the relevant offenses are not only punishable by
death, but also should be treated this way, if this is ever the
case. Indeed, arguably, the only relevant condition is the lat-
ter.
Blackstone's view hints to a possible explanation with re-
gard to limitations placed on the forfeiture of rights: aggres-
sors who perform an offense punishable by death lose their
right to life according to the law.'99 However, this explanation
only raises the same substantive question in a different for-
mulation: is the relevant law justified?
This line of response thus highlights a more general prob-
lem shared by other accounts of self-defense that rely on the
notion of rights: these accounts fail to justify their conclusion
because they do not provide an independent explanation of
the basis of their construal of the rights they invoke. For this
reason, it seems that these accounts beg the important ques-
tions and, in fact, are merely ways of expressing, rather than
justifying, normative conclusions.2°"
d. Overall Justification and Justice with Respect to
Rights
Uniacke acknowledges the circularity of rights-based ac-
counts of self-defense. She attempts to resolve this problem
by distinguishing between two normative categories: what is
199. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *133; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 178.
200. See McMahan, supra note 8, at 277-78 (stating that Thomson's view "is
an ingenious exercise in begging the question" and that the above response en-
tails a strange view that determines the scope of rights in light of contingent
factors such as the options of defense); Draper, supra note 66, at 86-89 (stating
that Thomson does not provide a justification for her view). Compare George P.
Fletcher, Defensive Force as an Act of Rescue, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POLVY 170, 178
(1990). As already noted, Thomson herself, despite her extensive reliance on
the notion of rights, seems to recognize that reference to rights is only a way of
expressing independent normative conclusions. There are also others problems
with accounts of self-defense that rely on the idea of forfeiture. For example,
their treatment of the case of putative self-defense: it is hard to see why an in-
nocent person, who is rationally but mistakenly considered to constitute a
threat, loses her right not to be harmed. See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 24. I
explain why such cases of putative self-defense should be considered justified in
Segev, supra note 5.
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justified (and accordingly unjustified) overall and what is just
(and accordingly unjust)-a notion that she interprets to refer
only to violations (or non-violations) of rights. In light of this
distinction, she defines the scope of the right to life only in
terms of what is just as opposed to what is justified. Under
her view, actions can be just but unjustified, for example,
when an agent uses necessary and proportional force, includ-
ing lethal force, against an unjust aggressor but is either un-
aware of the relevant circumstances or acts with a bad mo-
tive. Such actions, she claims, do not violate the aggressor's
right not to be harmed, but are nevertheless unjustified due
to the mental state of the agent. Similarly, she argues, ac-
tions can be unjust if they involve a violation of rights but
justified, if the violation is the only way to prevent a serious
harm to others.2 '
This distinction between the notions justified and just
can avoid circularity, and provide a basis for Uniacke's as-
sumptions regarding the scope of self-defense, only if an inde-
pendent account of the notion of just (and unjust), and, ac-
cordingly, of the content and scope of rights, is provided.
However, despite of Uniacke's extensive discussion of "the
self-defense justification of homicide," °2 and notwithstanding
the crucial role the distinction between justice and justifica-
tion plays in her theory concerning the basis for lethal self-
defense, she writes that such an account "is something that I
cannot realistically attempt here" and that this account "re-
mains important, unfinished business." Uniacke's omission is
of special significance since she rejects two kinds of "indirect"
accounts that, in her opinion, "have notable contemporary ad-
vocates" and "prima facie both seem plausible candidates for
generating the required exception": "a contract theory" and "a
two-level theory of optimality," essentially, rule-
utilitarianism.0 In support of her account of the justification
of self-defense, Uniacke thus eventually relies only upon what
she thinks is the "considerable intuitive plausibility" of her
assumptions concerning the scope of self-defense."°  There-
fore, Uniacke suggests only an unrealized possibility of a non-
circular theory that supports her conclusions, and, in fact, de-
201. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 210-18, 230-31.
202. This is the subtitle of her book, id.
203. Both accounts are suggested briefly by KAGAN, supra note 22, at 135.
204. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 218-28.
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rives these conclusions in a circular way from intuitions re-
garding the scope of self-defense.2"5
Furthermore, Uniacke's basic distinction and some of her
assumptions about the scope of self-defense seem perplexing
in themselves. First, her claim that there are two fundamen-
tal normative dimensions-what is "justified" overall and
what is "just" in terms of rights-rather than one substantive
normative category that takes account of all the relevant con-
siderations-seems to reflect an unexplained assumption that
there is something unique about rights in comparison to other
normative factors. More specifically, it is difficult to find a
convincing reason for considering the causal responsibility of
innocent aggressors and innocent threats as morally signifi-
cant. The claim made by Thomson and Uniacke is that even
an innocent, immediate attack or threat violates the right of
the person in danger not to be harmed. However, this view is
unexplained and seems unconvincing since, by definition, the
harm that innocent aggressors and innocent threats are ex-
pected to cause is not due to any choice they made. °6
2. Overriding the Rights ofAttackers?
Thomson mentions, in addition to her forfeiture theory,
also another version of a rights-based justification for self-
defense. According to this version, attackers retain the right
not to be harmed, even during the attack, but this right is
overridden by the rights of the people they endanger. Specifi-
cally, she suggests that an aggressor has a right not to be
killed but this right is not absolute and is overridden by the
205. See Kaufman, supra note 5, at 21 (Uniacke's account "serves as a re-
statement rather than an explanation or justification of self-defense").
206. Compare this criticism with Thomson's view that there is a morally sig-
nificant difference between, on the one hand, innocent aggressors, innocent
threats and innocent shields of threats, and, on the other hand, innocent by-
standers. See Alexander, supra note 63, at 53-66; Otsuka, supra note 63, at 74-
94 (arguing that innocent aggressors or threats do not violate rights);
McMahan, supra note 8, at 266-68, 275-76 (stating that Thomson's position,
that justified attacks involve violation of rights, entails the odd conclusion that
justified attackers lose their rights not to be harmed and to defend themselves);
Parent, supra note 174, at 405-17; Draper, supra note 66, at 86-90. Compare
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 436 n.85 (2d ed., Bobbs-
Merrill 1960) (claiming that protection against an insane attacker is akin not to
defense against a culpable aggressor but rather to protection from "a natural
force," since "an insane person is not bound by duties of the penal law" and
therefore "he cannot violate any legal right conferred by that law").
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victim's equivalent right not to be killed."°7
However, Thomson herself seems to acknowledge that
this idea does not provide a justification for self-defense, but
only assert that self-defense is justified, as long as it is not
accompanied by an explanation of why, and consequently
when, attackers' rights are overridden.
3. A Right against the State?
Sanford Kadish suggests a different kind of right-based
justification for self-defense.0 8 He presupposes that every
person has a moral right against the state "to the law's pro-
tection against the (intentional) deadly threats of others," as
well as against threats to other important interests, and per-
haps against threats to all interests. This right, he further
assumes, includes at least "a legal liberty" to resist such
threats "by all necessary means, including killing the aggres-
sor.
"2° 9
Kadish offers a contractualist reasoning as the basis for
this right. According to his explanation, "the individual does
not surrender his fundamental freedom to preserve himself
against aggression by the establishment of the state author-
ity," since such surrender is only rational when it "yields a
quid pro quo of greater, not lesser, protection against aggres-
sion that he had before." Kadish assumes that this is not the
case with respect to self-defense against imminent aggres-
sion. This analysis is applied both to culpable aggressors and
to innocent aggressors and innocent threats. Kadish claims
that defensive force against aggressors and people who con-
stitute threats does not violate their rights, since they have
only the parallel right against the state to resist aggression,
which, he argues, "is not violated by the victim who is only
defending against the other's aggression."
210
This account thus assumes that persons have a moral
right to harm aggressors, including innocent attackers or
207. Thomson, Self-Defense and Rights, supra note 174, at 42-47. Compare
Bedau, supra note 7, at 569 (claiming that "possession" of rights "is not always
dispositive of the issue of proper conduct by the individual or treatment by soci-
ety," since there are other considerations, such as "prior criminal act[s]" of the
right bearer, "scarcity of resources" and the need to resolve conflicts of rights).
208. See Kadish, supra note 192, at 884-88.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 885. Waldron interprets Kadish's view as agent-relative. See
Waldron, supra note 161, at 747.
446 Vol: 45
JUSTIFICATION FOR SELF-DEFENSE
threats, in self-defense. Therefore, this account only states
that if there is such a right, it does not disappear after the es-
tablishment of a state. However, even if it is unjustified for a
state to prevent persons from defending themselves or others
by harming culpable or innocent aggressors, this does not ex-
plain why such harm is justified."'
Kadish's account has been advocated as the most plausi-
ble account of self-defense on the ground that it "can generate
rational rules of criminal conduct," such as limiting self-
defense to necessary and proportionate force, as the right to
resist aggression is derived from the state, and therefore "the
state logically can define its scope narrowly to preserve im-
portant societal goals."212 But although "the state logically
can define" the scope of the right of self-defense in many
ways, in order to promote various goals, Kadish's account
does not explain how this right shouldbe molded.
B. Value-Based Accounts of Self-Defense
1. The Value of the Interests ofAggressors
A different kind of justification for preferring one indi-
vidual to another in interpersonal conflicts is based on a com-
parison of the value of their interests. Shelly Kagan points
out specifically that one way to capture the view that non-
responsible persons should be preferred to those who are re-
sponsible for the existence of a conflict is by discounting the
importance of the well-being of responsible persons, the dis-
count rate being determined in accordance with the degree of
responsibility.12 In this spirit, several commentators argue
that self-defense is justified based on a comparison of the
relative value of the interests of attackers and those of the
people they attack. According to this view, self-defense is jus-
tified since the interests of the former are less valuable than
those of the latter.
John Harris claims that, in contexts involving conflicts of
lives, self-defense against an unjustified and culpable aggres-
sor is justified because by attacking another person the ag-
gressor "is giving the world a reason to value his life less than
211. But see UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 222.
212. Omichinski, supra note 7, at 1467.
213. KAGAN, supra note 8, at 55.
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that of others." This, he explains, is because the aggression
itself "represents an attack on the very value that must sup-
port any defense of the value of [the aggressor's] own life."
Therefore, "[a]n aggressor could not ... consistently claim
that his own life should be respected while attempting to kill
his victim."14 Harris adds that "those wicked enough to at-
tempt to inflict such damage on others have ... in a sense
'volunteered' for any injury that preventing them may in-
volve." '15
George Fletcher provides a related account of self-
defense, which he attributes mainly to Anglo-American law.
This account, he explains, is based on
a comparison of the competing interests of the aggressor
and the defender. .. The factor that skews the balancing
in favor of the defender is the aggressor's culpability in
starting the fight ... His interests are discounted, as it
were, by the degree of his culpability. 21
These accounts lead to two conclusions regarding the
scope of self-defense. First, since these accounts seem to ap-
ply only to culpable aggressors, they do not justify the use of
defensive force against innocent aggressors and innocent
threats.217 Second, with respect to culpable aggressors, these
accounts seem to entail a requirement of proportionality,
which is indeed required by Anglo-American law,218 because
the interests of culpable aggressors, although discounted, still
should supposedly receive some consideration.
214. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 69.
215. Id. at 77.
216. FLETCHER, supra note 166, at 857-58; George P. Fletcher, Proportional-
ity and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette of Comparative Crlminal Theory, 8
ISR. L. REv. 367, 377 (1973); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 142; GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 24 (1988). See also Dressier, supra note 192, at 454:
[Slelf-defense is based on the moral premise that each person has a
right to life, and a concomitant right to protect that right, unless and
until the original actor unjustifiably violates another person's same or
equivalent right. When Victim threatens Actor's right to life, then, the
value of Victim's life, in societal terms, is reduced. The harm which
flows from his death is negated or, at least, reduced.
It is not clear whether Dressler refers only to culpable aggressors or also to in-
nocent attackers and innocent threats.
217. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 71-73.
218. See Ashworth, supra note 181, at 296-97; ROBINSON, supra note 80, at
81-88; PAUL H. ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 86-88 (1984).
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2. The Problem with Value-Based Accounts of Self-
Defense
The problem with value-based justifications of self-
defense is that they do not explain why, and to what extent,
an aggression diminishes the value of the aggressor's inter-
ests. The theory proposed in this article suggests that the re-
sponsibility of an aggressor for the conflict is a reason to sac-
rifice her interests rather than those of another, but this is
not because her interests are of no value, or are less valuable,
than those of other people. The interests of all persons, in-
cluding culpable aggressors, have value, and therefore there
is a reason not to harm even culpable aggressors. However,
the responsibility of aggressors for conflicts they cause, be-
tween their interests and the interests of the persons they at-
tack, is the basis for a competing reason that the responsible
aggressors, rather than their victims, should bear the inevi-
table cost of the conflict. This argument presents, in my opin-
ion, a more straightforward and plausible explanation as to
why self-defense is justified than the argument that the in-
terests of aggressors are less valuable than those of other
people.219
Harris' reference to the inconsistency in the hypothetical
position of aggressors, regarding the importance of each
party's well-being," even if correct, does not in itself support
the conclusion that it is justified to harm aggressors in self-
defense. First, the assumption that the inconsistency in the
hypothetical position of culpable aggressors shows that there
must be a justification for self-defense is doubtful, since the
source of this inconsistency is obvious: aggressors could not
consistently both justify their aggression and reject self-
defense against them since their aggression is unjustified.
Moreover, even if the inconsistency in the hypothetical posi-
tion of culpable aggressors would have showed that there
must be a justification for self-defense, it does not explain the
nature of this justification.
Harris' other remark, that aggressors "in a sense... vol-
unteered" for any injury that preventing their attack may in-
volve, is even more puzzling.22 It is hard to see in what rele-
219. See discussion supra Part III.C.
220. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 69.
221. Id. at 77.
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vant sense this is true, apart from the straightforward nor-
mative judgment - not based on any idea of actual consent (as
opposed to the normative idea of hypothetical consent) - that
it is right that the interests of aggressors, rather than those
of non-responsible victims, would be sacrificed when some
sacrifice is unavoidable.
3. Further Criticism of Value-Based Accounts of Self-
Defense
The suggestion that self-defense is justified due to the
diminished value of the aggressors' interests is often criti-
cized by claiming that it conflicts with several widely ac-
cepted views. Several aspects of this criticism are reasonable,
but other aspects imply unwarranted conclusions, in my opin-
ion.
One common accusation is that the diminished-value ac-
counts conflict with the widely held view (which is assumed to
be reflected in the law) that resolving interpersonal conflicts
should be based on the assumption that the lives of all indi-
viduals are of equal value. This view ignores, in particular,
judgments as to who is a morally better or worse person. For
example, according to this view, when it is possible to save
only one of two people, who would otherwise both drown, the
fact that one of them is a murderer should not be taken into
account in deciding who to save.222
This criticism might be correct if interpreted narrowly to
apply only to the assessment of the importance of the lives of
those involved in the conflict. But the above claim might re-
flect a wider view, which excludes considerations relating to
prior actions of the persons involved in interpersonal con-
flicts. According to one possible variation of this view, the
only relevant consideration in the resolution of interpersonal
conflicts is the relative importance of competing interests (as-
suming that everyone would agree that this is a valid consid-
eration, for example, that in a conflict between one person's
life and another's property, the former should prevail). This
interpretation should, I believe, be rejected, since it ignores
the normative significance of responsibility for the existence
of interpersonal conflicts, as reflected in the Principle of Fair-
222. See Kadish, supra note 192, at 880-82; Wasserman, supra note 121, at
358-59; Rosen, supra note 7, at 47.
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ness-Responsibility.
The argument that self-defense is justified since the in-
terests of aggressors are less valuable than those of others
has also been criticized on another ground. The diminished-
value argument could account for the common view that it is
justified to harm aggressors much more severely than the
harm they are expected to cause only if the value of the inter-
ests of aggressors would be diminished to an extremely low
degree.223 This seems implausible.224
While this criticism seems to raise a valid point, it is un-
warranted to the extent that it implies a rejection of a re-
quirement of proportionality in such conflicts. According to
the theory suggested in this paper, the expected harm in-
volved in any act, including harm to aggressors, is a reason
against the act (this view is expressed in the Well-Being Prin-
ciple).225 The force of this reason depends on the magnitude of
the act's effects, including the probability that it will cause
harm (this point is expressed in the Importance Principle). 226
Thus, while the Principle of Fairness-Responsibility provides
a reason to prefer a non-responsible person over a responsible
aggressor, this reason is not necessarily decisive, since it may
conflict with a reason based on the Importance Principle. De-
spite the responsibility of an aggressor for the existence of an
interpersonal conflict, it is unjustified, for example, to kill her
in order to prevent trivial damage to the property of a non-
responsible person or a low probability danger to a minor in-
terest of a non-responsible person.227
C. Intrusion-Based Accounts of Self-Defense
1. Unjustified Intrusions
Another common rationale for self-defense is based on
the idea that self-defense is justified since it stops an unjusti-
223. One recurring example is the claim that it is justified to kill many ag-
gressors in order to save one person they attack. Again, I am not sure that the
number of individuals involved in interpersonal conflicts is in itself a morally
significant factor. See Segev, The Significance of Numbers, supra note 9. But
obviously, this is the assumption underlying this criticism.
224. See Kadish, supra note 192, at 882; Wasserman, supra note 121, at 359;
McMahan, supra note 8, at 262.
225. See discussion supra Part III.A.
226. See discussion supra Part III.A.
227. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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fled (wrongful) intrusion of aggressors on others. This argu-
ment is typically applied to all aggressors, regardless of
whether they are responsible for their intrusion under a
choice-based conception of responsibility. Many commenta-
tors have suggested ideas of this kind as the basis for self-
defense.
According to Baruch Brody, self-defense is justified
against a person whose "continued existence ... poses a
threat" to the life of another by "unjustly" attempting to kill
her, regardless of whether the person who poses the threat is
responsible for this attempt.228  This claim resembles
Uniacke's suggestion, within her rights-based theory, that
self-defense is justified against persons who pose "unjust im-
mediate threats," whether culpable or not.
2 9
A variation of this theme is presented by Fletcher, who
associates it mainly with the view of Immanuel Kant and
with German and Soviet law. This variation is based on the
idea that unjustified attacks "intrude" or "encroach" upon the
"living space," "personal domain," or "bodily integrity" of indi-
viduals, and thus violate "individual autonomy" and, conse-
quently, the "Legal Order." Fletcher argues that this account
supports unlimited self-defense on the ground that "Right
need never yield to Wrong." Particularly, he interprets this
theory to imply that self-defense is equally justified against
any unjustified (wrongful) aggressor, whether culpable or not,
and without qualification by a requirement of proportionality.
In his words, "killing an aggressor is permissible if it is the
only means available to prevent the invasion of even a minor
interest. " 'O
Fletcher sometimes qualifies this assertion by distin-
guishing between the notion of "Right," which completely ig-
nores the interests of wrongful aggressors, and the notion of
228. Baruch Brody, Thomson on Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 335, 336
(1972).
229. UNIACKE, supra note 4, at 172-93.
230. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 141; FLETCHER, supra note 121, at 136, 144;
FLETCHER, supra note 166, at 860-74; Fletcher, supra note 200, at 171-72;
FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 216, at 32-33, 35-36;
Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 216, at 378-
87; George P. Fletcher, Punishment and Self-Defense, 8 LAW & PHIL. 201, 210,
213-15 (1989); George P. Fletcher, The Nature of Justification, in ACTION AND
VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 175, 181 (John Gardner et al. eds., Clarendon Press
1993).
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"morality" or "justice," which takes account of the interests of
aggressors and thus supports a requirement of proportional-
ity. He suggests that although the former notion dominates
the law of self-defense, the latter, which he associates mainly
with the institution of punishment, affect it as well."l
Fletcher also notes that both German and Soviet law, despite
their alleged reliance on the above account of self-defense, in
fact qualify the position that the protection of rights is unlim-
ited by introducing, like Anglo-American law, a requirement
of proportionality, for example, through the doctrine of "abuse
of rights."232
Charles Fried advocates a similar theory. According to
his theory, an "unjustified attack creates a relation ... of
wrong, between the attacker and his victim," which justifies
harming the attacker in self-defense. He applies this analysis
to all intentional attacks, both culpable and innocent, such as
that of an insane aggressor, and perhaps even to persons who
pose innocent threats without acting intentionally, such as a
person who is falling on another uncontrollably. 3
Similarly, Frances Kamm argues that, where a conflict
exists between a person who poses an innocent threat and
another person, the former should generally bear the cost of
the conflict since "it is inappropriate for a person to impose on
another person without the latter's permission." "To be in
that position," she further argues, "is to stand in an inappro-
priate relation to the other person (even if the imposition is
not the result of anyone's unjust act).""u Kamm leaves open
the question of whether her thesis should apply to all inter-
personal conflicts. She writes that it applies, at least, if the
expected harm to both parties is "low but not insignificant,"
and if the harm to the innocent threat is a "minor injury"
231. Fletcher, Punishment and Self-Defense, supra note 230, at 208-15.
232. FLETCHER, supra note 121, at 136-37, 144-45; Fletcher, supra note 166,
at 871-74; Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor, supra note
216, at 368, 390; Fletcher, Pumishment and Self-Defense, supra note 230, at
181. With respect to German law, see also Mordechai Kremnitzer, Proporional-
ity and the Psychotic Aggressor: Another View, 18 ISR. L. REV. 178, 210-11
(1983).
233. FRIED, supra note 10, at 44-53.
234. Frances Myrna Kamm, The Insanity Defense, Innocent Threats, and
Limited Alternatives, 6 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 61, 65 (1987). Kamm suggests that
the person who constitutes the innocent threat is required to stop the threat
and perhaps to compensate the other for the harm caused by the threat.
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compared to death to the other innocent person." But she
does not explain the grounds for this very significant qualifi-
cation. If this is the entire scope of her theory, then it is very
limited indeed. Conversely, the thesis suggested in this arti-
cle provides that in Kamm's last example, when the conflict is
between life of one innocent person and a "minor injury" to
another innocent person, the "minor injury" is justified, in
light of the Substantial Difference Principle, regardless of
who constitutes the (innocent) threat.236
Paul Robinson offers a different variation of the intru-
sion-based account of self-defense. He suggests that the "bal-
ancing of harms" should include not only "physical harms,"
but also "intangible evils," like "the compelling societal inter-
est" in preserving the rights of "bodily autonomy" and "prop-
erty ownership" of individuals and like the general interest in
"condemning unjustified aggression.""7 This account is remi-
niscent of Thomson's view that self-defense is justified be-
cause both culpable and innocent aggressions violate the
rights of the individuals they attack. 8 Here, however, the
emphasis shifts from analysis of rights to the "intangible
harms" of entering the personal sphere of people which often
accompany physical aggression.
Finally, Michael Gorr does not offer a justification for
self-defense, because, as noted in the introduction, he doubts
whether this is possible. But Gorr does suggest some princi-
ples for the resolution of various conflicts, one of which con-
siders the fact that a person is posing a threat, including in-
nocent threat, to another as a morally significant factor. Gorr
attempts to explain the basis for the intuitive distinction be-
tween an innocent bystander, whom he thinks may not be
justifiably harmed in order to prevent a similar harm to an-
other, and an innocent threat, whom he thinks it is obviously
permitted to harm in order to prevent a similar harm to the
victim. He suggests that the fact "that someone poses a
threat to another is itself morally significant enough to gen-
erate a liberty or permission ... to take defensive measures
against him but not morally significant enough, in the ab-
sence of fault ... to trigger a full-blown right to the use of
235. Id.
236. See discussion supra Part III.C.
237. ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 70.
238. Thomson, supra note 184, at 283-310.
454 Vol: 45
JUSTIFICATION FOR SELF-DEFENSE
such measures." Gorr acknowledges that "it is difficult to see
why the mere fact that a person plays a causal role in threat-
ening harm to another has any moral relevance whatever"
when this person is not responsible for playing such a role.
He even concedes that "the difference between an innocent
aggressor and a victim, namely, the fact that the behaviour of
the former threatens the latter rather than the other way
round, could have the requisite significance only if ... [the
aggressor was] in some way at fault in bringing about such a
threat." Indeed, he concludes by admitting that the question
of why it is permissible to harm innocent threats but not in-
nocent bystanders "is a perplexing question for which I do not
at present have any good answer." Yet, he insists that al-
though he cannot explain why posing an innocent threat is
morally significant, it must be so since this is the only way to
account for the intuitive distinction between innocent by-
standers and innocent threats.239
2. The Normative Insignificance of Intrusion
The main problem with all intrusion-based accounts of
self-defense is that they fail to explain why an unjustified in-
trusion on a person justifies harming the intruder, if the lat-
ter is not responsible for the situation under a choice-based
conception of responsibility. The resolution of interpersonal
conflicts should take account of the well-being of all persons
involved. When resolving conflicts between non-responsible
persons, the only valid reason to prefer one over the other is
the relative importance of the competing interests. This rea-
son is strong enough to outweigh the Equal Chance Principle
only when there is a substantial gap in the importance of the
competing interests."' Otherwise, since the well-being of both
non-responsible parties is equally important, and fairness
does not provide a reason to prefer either, we should follow
the Equal Chance Principle. This is, of course, if there is no
way of avoiding the conflict, for example, by restraining the
aggressor without harming either party.
An "imposition" or "intrusion" on persons is no doubt un-
desirable, since it typically has a negative impact on the well-
being of those who suffer the intrusion. Therefore, there is a
239. Gorr, supra note 6, at 248, 250, 252-53.
240. See discussion supra Part III.C.
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reason, reflected in the Well-Being Principle, to stop intru-
sions. But when this involves harming the intruder, there is
an additional, contrary, reason, which also stems from the
Well-Being Principle that applies also to non-responsible in-
truders, not to harm the innocent intruder. None of the above
accounts explain why the cost of an unjustified intrusion
should fall on an innocent intruder who is not responsible for
the intrusion. A non-responsible intrusion does not constitute
a cogent reason for preferring one innocent person to another.
It seems that the views discussed in this section consider only
one side of the equation-the reason to protect an innocent
party from an attack. But there is also a contrary reason to
take account of the interests of attackers, especially when
they are innocent too."4 This reason, combined with the idea
expressed in the Importance Principle, is why, even if intru-
sion were a morally significant factor, proportionality should
241. Fletcher's view has been criticized on the similar ground that rights of
individuals are not "absolute" but rather "context-sensitive," and that the reso-
lution of interpersonal conflicts should also take account of other considerations,
beyond the reason to prevent intrusions, such as the interests or "rights" of oth-
ers and the innocence or culpability of others with respect to the conflict at
hand. See Kremnitzer, supra note 232, at 183-89; Larry Alexander, Justifica-
tion and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1177, at 1182 (1987).
Fletcher's view has also been criticized, in a similar spirit, based on a contrac-
tual reasoning and the idea of equality, according to which the interests and
rights of aggressors should be taken into account as well. See David A. J. Rich-
ards, Human Rights and the Moral Foundation of the Substantive Criminal
Law, 13 GA. L. REV. 1395, 1435-36 (1979); David A. J. Richards, Rights, Resis-
tance, and the Demands of Self-Respect, 32 EMORY L.J. 405, 426 (1983) ("[T]he
proportionality requirement rests ... on equal concern for both parties' inter-
ests in physical integrity. Unjust aggression disturbs the underlying equality in
moral rights to basic goods only to the extent required to return the parties to
equality."). Indeed, both Fried and Fletcher are aware that their suggestions
raise the problem of determining, on non-arbitrary grounds, the difference be-
tween defense against an innocent threat and other interpersonal conflicts in
which there is a conflict between the interests of innocent bystanders. See
FRIED, supra note 10, at 53; FLETCHER, supra note 166, at 862-64; FLETCHER,
supra note 121, at 143-45. The view that any intrusion justifies harming the
intruder has also been criticized on the ground that it leads to the odd conclu-
sion that unjustified and responsible aggressors are justified in defending them-
selves against their victims who fight back. See McMahan, supra note 8, at
257-58 (criticizing what he calls the "Orthodox View," according to which it is
justified to harm anyone who is harming another); Russell Christopher, Self-
Defense and Objectivity: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thomson, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 537, 538 (1998) ("[Thomson's] objective approach, properly considered, not
only justifies the threats posed by morally innocent, but causally harmful, ac-
tors, but also the force used by culpable (evil) aggressors and unwittingly for-
feits the life of morally and causally innocent victims.").
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still be required.2 41 Indeed, the above reason is the basis for
the requirement of proportionality with respect to responsible
aggressors, despite the reason to prefer non-responsible per-
sons over them.
As Gorr emphasizes, the distinction between an innocent
bystander and an innocent threat seems to have an intuitive
appeal. The proper place of intuitions in normative thinking
is complex and controversial. Doubtless, reliance on intuition
in philosophical and legal discussions is common and often
extensive.2 3 But there also seems to be a wide agreement
that intuitions are fallible and require rational support.2
This article rests on the assumption that intuitions should be
justified on rational grounds. If we assume that there are
correct normative standards, then normative conclusions
should be ultimately based on a rational analysis of reasons
rather than on mere intuitions, as there is no reason to as-
sume that intuitions constitute correct normative standards
or that they are always guided to them by an invisible hand.
There may be some room for intuitions in normative thinking,
as a starting point to normative inquiry, but the emphasis, I
think, should be on rational reflection.
Notably, intuitive reasoning can yield conflicting conclu-
sions. Specifically, the intuitive judgment regarding the rele-
vant question is not one-sided. Beside the intuition that dis-
tinguishes between innocent bystanders and innocent
threats, there seems to be also an intuitive support to the
more general idea that innocent persons should be treated
242. Contrary to Fletcher's interpretation of the "autonomy" view. See dis-
cussion supra Part V.C. 1.
243. For dominant general examples, see Thomson, Afterward, supra note
174, at 257-60; THOMSON, supra note 10, at 4-33; KAMM, supra note 10; F. M.
KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY, VOL. 2: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND STATUS (1996).
244. See generally SIDGWICK, supra note 11, at 101-03, 214-16; Richard B.
BRANDT, THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 2-3, 16-23, 44, 185-88 (Clarendon Press
1979); SCHEFFLER, supra note 36, at 83-84, 112; SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, HUMAN
MORALITY 11-16 (1992); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 1-2 (Clarendon Press 1986); Shelly
Kagan, The Additive Fallacy, 99 ETHICS 5 (1988); KAGAN, supra note 22, at 11-
14; KAGAN, supra note 8, at 14-16; PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING
DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE 10-13 (1996); R. M. Hare, Ethical Theory and
Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 23-24 (Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams eds., 1982); Raymond G. Frey, Act-Utilitarianism, Consequentialism,
and Moral Rights, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 61, 81 (Raymond G. Frey ed., Basil
Blackwell 1985); J. L. Mackie, Rights, Utility, and Universalization, in UTILITY
AND RIGHTS 86, 97-98 (Raymond G. Frey ed., Basil Blackwell 1985).
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equally in the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, inter alia,
in the sense that one innocent person should not be preferred
over another. Therefore a conflict exists in this context be-
tween two strong intuitions, and the overall conclusion in the
intuitive sphere is unclear. When this is the case, there is all
the more reason to turn to rational reflection.
Furthermore, the intuition that a person may defend
herself against an innocent attacker, even when this involves
inflicting more harm upon the innocent attacker than is ac-
ceptable to inflict upon an innocent bystander, could be ex-
plained on two alternative grounds that do not rely on the
doubtful assumption that intrusion per se is morally signifi-
cant.
First, intuitions regarding conflicts involving aggression
are probably influenced by the fact that in real-life cases most
aggressors are culpable and therefore, when the agent does
not have information concerning this issue, it is reasonable to
assume so based on experience. This rational assumption of
culpability justifies preferring the person being attacked over
the aggressor in most conflicts, and this conclusion holds true
even when the rational assumption turns out to be mistaken
245in a specific case.
Second, the intuition that it is permissible to harm inno-
cent threats in defense, more than innocent bystanders in in-
terpersonal conflicts, could at least be partly attributed to the
observation that the employment of defensive force should of-
ten be excused. This is especially true in common situations
that involve an immediate danger to the life or bodily integ-
rity of the person under attack.246
Fletcher rejects the claim that persons who defend them-
selves against innocent aggressors may typically be excused
on the ground that this view implies two conclusions he con-
siders mistaken. The first is that third parties are not justi-
fied in intervening in order to help the victims of innocent ag-
gressors by harming the aggressors. The second is that
245. See generally Segev, supra note 5 (elaborating on the relation between
justification, rationality and mistake).
246. See Alexander, supra note 241, at 1184-88 (explaining the view that de-
fending oneself against an innocent aggressor or threat is not justified but can
often be excused); compare Draper, supra note 66, at 83 (noting that excuse is
especially relevant when people defend themselves against immediate threats);
Gorr, supra note 6, at 248, 250, 252-53 (claiming that the employment of defen-
sive force against innocent threats is "permissible" but not "completely right").
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innocent aggressors who fight back are.justified.247 It seems,
however, that the first implication is not disturbing, once
properly understood, and the second is simply false.
The first implication is not disturbing when we remind
ourselves that third parties are justified in intervening in or-
der to stop the attack of innocent aggressors, and thus resolve
the conflict, in light of the principles governing the interac-
tion of non-responsible parties. Most notably, intervention is
justified if it could resolve the conflict without harming either
party. The thesis suggested in this article also justifies inter-
vention by third parties in order to resolve such conflicts
when this involves harm to one of the innocent parties (which
will typically be the aggressor) provided that the intervention
minimizes the harm to both parties to a roughly equal extent
or if the harm inflicted to one is significantly less severe than
the harm the other party is otherwise expected to suffer.
2 41
What is unjustified is to prefer the interests of one innocent
party over another on the ground that one constitutes the
threat when he is not responsible for this fact according to a
choice-based conception of responsibility.
The second implication that Fletcher attributes to the
view that people who defend themselves against innocent ag-
gressors are excused - namely, that innocent aggressors who
fight back are justified - is simply mistaken. Although a per-
son who defends herself against an innocent aggressor by
harming the latter might not be justified, this obviously does
not imply that the aggressor is necessarily justified. If a per-
son who defends herself against an innocent aggressor is not
justified, since he deviates from the proper principles that
govern the interaction of innocent parties, and therefore is, at
most, only excused, why is an innocent aggressor, who fights
back in a similar manner against a similarly innocent attack,
necessarily justified? If the innocent aggressor also deviates
from the above principles, then both parties are, at most, only
excused.249
247. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 216,
at 375.
248. See discussion supra Part III.C.
249. See McMahan, supra note 8, at 286-87.
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
This article's thesis is that the justification for the em-
ployment of defensive force, like the justification for the em-
ployment of force in general, should be based on the interac-
tion of considerations of well-being and fairness. These
considerations include the relative importance of the interests
of the persons involved in the conflict and the relative respon-
sibility of the persons for the existence of the conflict. The
justification to harm an unjustified and culpable aggressor, in
the paradigm case of self-defense, is the most obvious exam-
ple for the latter consideration.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the para-
digm case of self-defense is only one example for the applica-
bility of the general principles suggested in this article for the
resolution of interpersonal conflicts, including the fairness-
based reason to prefer a person who is not responsible for the
existence of a conflict over a person who is, or who is more,
responsible. At the same time, it is also important to remem-
ber that the implications of the proposed principles might be
very different in other kinds of interpersonal conflicts, in
which the nature and degree of responsibility for the conflict,
and its interaction with other potentially conflicting consid-
erations, might radically differ."'
250. Several other kinds of interpersonal conflicts, which differ, particularly,
in the nature and accordingly in the significance of responsibility, are discussed
in Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, supra note 9; Segev, Well-Being and Fair-
ness in the Distribution of Scarce Health Resources, supra note 9; and Segev,
The Concept of Lesser Evil, supra note 9.
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